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ABSTRACT 
THE ECONOMICS OF SAME-SEX COUPLES HOUSHOLEDS: ESSAYS ON WORK, 
WAGES, AND POVERTY 
SEPTEMBER 2013 
ALYSSA SCHNEEBAUM, B.A., BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST 
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor M. V. Lee Badgett 
Since Badgett’s (1995a) landmark study on the wage effects of sexual orientation, 
interest in and production of scholarly work addressing the economics of sexual 
orientation has grown tremendously. Curious puzzles have emerged in the literature on 
the economics of same-sex couple households, three of which are addressed in detail in 
this dissertation.  
Most studies of the wages of women in same-sex couples versus different-sex 
couples find that the former earn more, even controlling for differences in present labor 
market supply, education, experience, area of residence, and occupation. However, most 
previous studies of the sexual orientation wage gap omit the role of motherhood in the 
lesbian-straight women wage gap, and most take the sample of lesbians to be a 
homogenous group compared to straight women. Chapter 1 uses American Community 
Survey data from 2010 to study the wage gap between lesbians and straight women, 
putting motherhood in intra-household differences at the center of the analysis. The 
analysis shows that in terms of earnings, lesbian couples are quite heterogeneous; one 
partner has a large wage premium over straight women, and the other faces a large wage 
vii 
 
penalty. These findings are enhanced when a child is present in the lesbians’ home, 
possibly suggesting a household division of labor in lesbian homes. 
Chapter 2 considers the possibility that same-sex couples, like many different-sex 
couples, have one person who specializes in paid work while the other specializes in 
unpaid work for the household, such as housework and childcare. Chapter 2 presents a 
study which uses American Time Use Survey Data pooled from 2003-2011 to analyze the 
time spent in household, care, and paid work for members of different couple types and 
finds that in same-sex as well as different-sex couple households, some personal 
characteristics, such as being the lower earner in the household, are correlated with 
spending more time in household and care work.  
Chapter 3 offers a study of poverty in same-sex versus different-sex couple 
households, exploring which characteristics are correlated with poverty for same-sex and 
different-sex couple households. When controlling for a couple’s education level, area of 
residence, race and ethnicity, age, and household composition, same-sex couples are 
more likely to be in poverty than their different-sex counterparts.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation consists of three essays addressing issues in the economics of 
same-sex couple households. The research on sexual orientation in the economics 
literature is sparse relative to the amount of work analyzing the economic position of 
other minority groups. Marieka Klawitter supposes a lack of research on sexual 
orientation in economics is due to “discrimination against sexual minorities, the lack of 
interest and knowledge about sexual orientation, the absence of support for this research, 
and the scarcity of appropriate models and data” (1998, p. 55). Badgett (1995b) also 
points out that economists cannot impose an analysis of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) 
people onto existing models that are based on heterosexual families, asserting that we 
need to create new methods to get a picture of how sexual orientation matters in 
economics.  
 In spite of these challenges, there has been a strong emergence of studies looking 
at issues of sexual orientation since Badgett’s (1995a) landmark study looking at the 
wage effects of sexual orientation. Since then, there have been dozens of empirical papers 
studying the effect of sexual orientation on wage and employment outcomes. The top-
ranked Journal of Economic Perspectives, for example, has included an article on the 
economics of gay and lesbian families (Black et al. 2007). Political advancements and 
social movements in the area of LGB life are making research increasingly possible 
because more LGB people are “out,” or open about their sexual orientation; there are 
more data available; and more organizations are funding research in this area. 
Despite this recent growth in interest and support for research on this sexual 
orientation in economics, the field still contains many unanswered questions. A major 
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barrier to studying the economic lives of LGB people remains: there is a serious data 
constraint on researchers to find large-scale, representative data. While smaller data sets 
which come from surveys such as the General Social Survey or the California Health 
Interview Survey that ask respondents about their sexual behavior do exist, the best data 
for economists studying sexual orientation come from the decennial US Censuses in 1990 
and 2000 and American Community Surveys. The Current Population Survey, which is 
linked to the American Time Use Survey, is also a good source of data for answering 
questions regarding sexual orientation. In those surveys, however, there are no questions 
about sexual orientation; researchers can only identify households in which the 
householder is in a same-sex couple.
1
 As this dissertation addresses questions regarding 
the economics of same-sex couples, the data constraint problem is less of an issue.   
The three research questions on the economics of same-sex couple households 
addressed in this dissertation are as follows. In chapter 1, I address the curious puzzle that 
has emerged from studies examining the wage effects of sexual orientation for women.  
Although lesbian and bisexual women face discrimination in the labor market, most 
studies of the wages of female workers in same-sex couples versus in different-sex 
couples find that the lesbians earn more, even after controlling for differences in present 
labor market supply, education, years of experience, area of residence, and occupation. 
However, previous studies of the sexual orientation wage gap consistently omitted two 
important issues. First, although motherhood has been shown to play an important role in 
                                                 
1
 A note on semantics is in order. In this dissertation, I call members of same-sex couples 
“gay” or “lesbian.” While recognizing the differences between sexual behavior, identity, 
and attraction (cf. Laumann 1994), I simplify language use here and call women in same-
sex couples “lesbians”; men in same-sex couples “gay”; and people in different-sex 
couples “straight” or “heterosexual,” although we do not know about their actual 
preferred identities. 
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determining women’s wages, the role of motherhood in the straight-lesbian wage gap has 
not been adequately addressed. Second, previous studies have taken the sample of 
lesbians to be a homogenous group compared to straight women without considering the 
possibility that there is a “primary” and “secondary” group of earners among lesbians, as 
there is in different-sex couples.  
Chapter 1 therefore tests for a wage gap between lesbians and straight women, 
giving particular attention to the role of motherhood and incorporating the possibility that 
in terms of wages, two distinct groups of lesbians exist. I employ 2010 American 
Community Survey to perform standard OLS wage regressions, a Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition to examine the role motherhood on the lesbian-straight wage gap at the 
mean, and a DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux decomposition to do so at all points along the wage 
distribution. The results show that while motherhood is typically negatively correlated 
with wages for straight women, it is positively related to wages for the group of lesbians 
as a whole. However, the positive relationship between earnings and wages holds only 
for primary lesbian partners; the relationship between motherhood and wages is negative 
for the secondary partners. The differing effect of motherhood for the two groups of 
lesbians may be an indication that lesbian couples engage in some degree of 
specialization, implying that some lesbians behave more like “mothers” and some more 
like “fathers”. Furthermore, there is overall a strong lesbian wage premium for the 
primary lesbians, but a wage penalty for secondary lesbians. The work presented in 
chapter 1 therefore addresses intra-household wage inequality in same-sex female 
couples. 
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Following from this point, the work in chapter 2 explicitly addresses the 
possibility that there is a household division of labor into paid and unpaid work in same-
sex couples. In most different-sex couples, the man in the couple spends more minutes 
per day than the woman in paid work, while the woman spends more time than the man 
in unpaid household work, care work, and supervisory care work. Chapter 2 considers the 
possibility that the specialization in paid versus unpaid work can be based on personal 
characteristics of people in a couple other than their gender. I consider the time spent in 
the four different types of work for people in same-sex couples as well as different-sex 
couples. I use American Time Use Survey Data pooled from 2003-2011 to analyze the 
time spent in household, care, and paid work for members of different couple types, 
finding some evidence that one member of the couple specializes in one of these tasks 
while the other couple member specializes in another. The race, ethnicity, and earnings of 
the people in same-sex couples play a role in determining the tasks performed by the two 
partners. Furthermore, the relationship between intra-couple income differences and a 
couple member’s time spent in the various tasks is stronger for same-sex couples who 
live in a state with access to marriage or a marriage-like institution than for those who do 
not, suggesting that marriage is related to a same-sex couple’s labor choices. 
The lack of ubiquitous access to same-sex marriage therefore makes a difference 
in the economic lives of same-sex couples. There may be other economic consequences 
of unequal treatment of same-sex couples, as well. In chapter 3, I study poverty in same-
sex couples. Poverty is one of the most widely researched topics in economics, but very 
little is known about poverty in same-sex couple households. The work in chapter 3 uses 
data from the 2010 American Community Survey to estimate poverty rates for four 
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different household types: those in which the householder is in a different-sex married 
couple, a different-sex unmarried couple, a same-sex male couple, and or same-sex 
female couple. The study presents a probit model to test the households’ relative 
probability of being in poverty while holding many factors constant. Further, I show a 
decomposition of the probability of being in poverty into the characteristics in different 
households versus the returns to those characteristics, which can differ by household 
type. Comparing households with similar characteristics, female same-sex couple 
households are more likely to be in poverty than different-sex married couple households. 
Lesbian couples experience lower returns to characteristics which typically help couples 
escape from poverty, meaning that lesbians are at an economic disadvantage despite their 
over-investment in education and high labor force participation rates.  
This dissertation sheds light on the wages, the working decisions, and the extent 
of poverty in same-sex couple households. Taken together, the three papers in this 
dissertation address many important aspects of the economic lives of same-sex couples. 
First, an important result from chapters 1 and 2 is that there is intra-household income 
inequality in same-sex couples; the two people in a same-sex couple can have different 
working patterns, earn different wages, and the effect of children can be different for each 
of them. Second, broader institutional structures – in particular, inequality under the law 
– affect the economic situation of same-sex couples, as shown in chapters 2 and 3. A lack 
of access to federal same-sex marriage and anti-discrimination in employment, for 
example, can contribute to different working choices of same-sex couples and put them at 
a greater risk of poverty. Finally, the results from chapters 1 and 3 show that female 
same-sex couples are at a strong economic disadvantage compared to different-sex 
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couples. Even when one lesbian partner earns more than her partner and more than 
straight women, on average, the couple together is most likely to be in poverty out of all 
couple types. Inequality in wages, work, and poverty is therefore a complex phenomenon, 
both within households and across households. This dissertation informs the role of 
sexual orientation in this discussion.  
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CHAPTER 1 
MOTHERHOOD AND THE LESBIAN WAGE PREMIUM 
 
Introduction 
 It is a common empirical finding that in the US, female full-time workers in 
same-sex couples earn higher wages than those in different-sex couples, even controlling 
for differences in present labor market supply, education, years of working experience, 
area of residence, and occupation (Klawitter 2012). Despite the growing amount of 
literature on the topic since Badgett’s (1995) seminal paper, there are two critical 
components to the study of the lesbian-straight wage gap that have been left out of almost 
all analyses on the subject.  First, the role of motherhood
2
 in the wages of lesbians versus 
straight women has been absent from the literature in all but two recent papers. Second, 
the possibility that there is a “primary” and “secondary” lesbian earner within each 
couple – where the primary (secondary) partner is the higher (lower) earner in her own 
couple, or the householder (partner) on the household roster – has only come up in one 
study, which looks at labor supply, not wages. This paper addresses both of these 
omissions from the sexual orientation wage gap literature.  
Only one paper has looked explicitly at the relationship between motherhood and 
wages for lesbians (Baumle 2009), finding that there is a positive relationship between 
motherhood (which Baumle defines as living in a household with any children) and 
wages for lesbians working full-time, net of differences in experience, education, race, 
ethnicity, fluency in English, and metropolitan status. This positive relationship between 
                                                 
2
 In this study, I use two alternative definitions of “mother”. The first is for a woman living in a household 
with a related child, and the second is being considered a “probable” mother in the IPUMS data. More 
detail is below. 
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motherhood and wages for lesbians explains about 35 percent of what has been called the 
“lesbian wage premium” – the remaining positive wage gap of lesbians’ earnings over 
straight women’s earnings once controlling for observable characteristics. An earlier 
study by Jepsen (2007) finds that a wage premium exists for full-time working lesbians 
compared to straight women in households both with and without children, even 
controlling for experience, industry, occupation, race, education, metropolitan status, 
disability status, and proficiency with the English language, although the study does not 
look explicitly at the relationship between children and wages for lesbians (via an 
interaction term between being a lesbian and a mother in the OLS model, for example). 
The present study builds upon Jepsen’s (2007) and Baumle’s (2009) work by not just 
analyzing a newer sample of women in the US with more informative econometric 
techniques, but by addressing the possibility that the effect of motherhood on wages is 
different for lesbians playing different roles in the parenting division of labor.   
The second part of the analysis directly follows this point. This is the first paper in 
the literature on the sexual orientation wage gap to consider the possibility that there are 
primary and secondary earners within each lesbian couple – meaning that we should 
compare these groups to straight women separately to get a more complete picture of the 
wages of coupled American lesbians. On this point I draw on the insights of Antecol & 
Steinberger (2011), as they show a labor supply gap within lesbian couples. As this paper 
is primarily concerned with addressing the wages of different of groups of lesbians to 
those of straight women, I take the group of straight women to be a homogenous 
comparison group, although some straight women are “primary” partners in their 
9 
 
relationships in that they earn more than their male partners or consider themselves to be 
the head of their households.  
 Two key results emerge from the analysis. The first is that there is a positive 
relationship between motherhood and wages for the group of lesbians as a whole, 
compared to the negative relationship between motherhood and wages for straight 
women, even controlling for potential work experience (age minus years of education 
minus five)
3
 and present labor supply. A second important finding is that the effect of 
being a mother on wages is quite different for primary lesbian partners and secondary 
lesbian partners. Motherhood is negatively correlated with wages for the secondary 
lesbian partner, but strongly positively correlated with wages for the primary partner. 
More generally, there is a wage premium over straight women for the group of primary 
lesbians, but a lesbian wage penalty for the group of secondary lesbians.  
 
The “Lesbian Wage Premium” 
Empirical studies of the wages of lesbians versus straight women consistently find 
that there is an unconditional wage gap between lesbians and straight women, in which 
lesbians earn more. Once controlling for differences in education, experience, location, 
and occupation, either there is no significant difference between the women’s wages 
(Badgett 1995; Klawitter & Flatt 1998; Carpenter 2005 in California), or lesbians receive 
higher wages than straight women (Badgett 2001; Clain & Leppel 2001, Berg & Lien 
2002; Black et al. 2003; Blandford 2003; Jepson 2007; Antecol et al. 2008; Baumle et al. 
                                                 
3
 In the data set I employ here, we cannot measure actual working experience. This omission is likely to 
bias the estimates of the motherhood penalty upwards, because actual labor market experience has a 
strong(positive) impact on earnings and is strongly (negatively) affected by motherhood.  
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2009; Cushing-Daniels & Yeung 2009) – a “lesbian wage premium.” Peplau & Fingerhut 
(2004) call the lesbian premium a “paradox”: we might expect lesbians to earn less than 
similarly situated straight women due to labor market discrimination based on sexual 
orientation (cf. Badgett 1995; Weichselbaumer 2003; Elmslie & Tebaldi 2007), but 
instead we see that lesbian workers earn more.  
As with any wage gap question, there are observable and unobservable 
characteristics that help explain the unconditional wage difference between lesbians and 
straight women.  Two explanations for lesbians’ higher unconditional earnings are based 
on unobservable demand-side issues. The first is that employers might engage in 
statistical discrimination against straight women compared to lesbians. If employers 
expect that straight women are more likely to leave their job or make less of a workplace 
commitment because of family responsibilities, employers would prefer lesbians to 
equally qualified straight women. In other words, discrimination against straight women 
can benefit lesbians. Second, employers may prefer lesbian to straight employees because 
lesbians might display and/or their employers expect them to display more masculine 
characteristics, such as assertiveness, dominance, autonomy, competence, and 
detachment – characteristics more preferable in the competitive labor market (Clain & 
Leppel 2001; Peplau & Fingerhut 2004; Jepsen 2007). Furthermore, similar stereotypes 
may affect lesbian and straight mothers differently. Peplau & Fingerhut (2004) conducted 
an experiment of 162 undergraduate students, finding that the students considered straight 
mothers less competent and less committed to their job than non-mothers, but did not 
pass the same judgment on lesbian mothers. These stereotypes and prejudices, however 
11 
 
problematic, benefit lesbians’ pay in the labor market – they are an instance of what some 
would call “positive discrimination.” 
While employers might have expectations that benefit lesbians’ wages, there are 
three observable supply-side effects that may contribute to the unconditional lesbian-
straight wage gap. First, lesbians’ preferences for and access to occupation and industry 
of employment may be different than straight women’s. Controlling for occupation and 
industry reduces the lesbian earnings advantage; the relatively high number of lesbians in 
male-dominated occupations helps to push lesbians’ wages higher (Blandford 2003; 
Black et al. 2007a; Baumle et al. 2009). It might be a matter of worker preference or 
opportunity, but there are more lesbians in higher-paid “male jobs” than straight women 
(see Badgett & King 1997 for a discussion of lesbian occupational choice). An empirical 
test of the relative importance of occupation sorting in explaining the lesbian wage 
premium using 2000 US Census data, however, finds that the effect of different 
occupational choice on women’s wages does not make a significant difference between 
the wages of lesbians and married straight women, especially at the lower end of the 
earnings distribution (Antecol et al. 2008).  
A second labor supply issue explaining the lesbians’ higher earnings is that 
lesbians have much higher levels of human capital than straight women, particularly in 
educational attainment. Partly to counteract the negative income effect of pairing with 
another woman (Badgett 2001; Berg & Lein 2002; Black et al. 2003) and partly because 
of the longer opportunity to pursue her education without getting sidetracked by marriage 
and family responsibilities (Daneshvary et al. 2009), lesbians have and enjoy the benefits 
of higher levels of education. Antecol et al. (2008) show that combining the effects of 
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occupational sorting and differences in educational attainment can explain between half 
and three-quarters of the lesbian wage premium, most of which is due to differences in 
education; including experience explains even more of the wage gap.  They find this to be 
particularly true at the higher end of the earnings spectrum: occupational sorting and 
especially educational differences explain most of the unconditional lesbian wage 
advantage for women in the top three income deciles (p. 538, Figure 4).  
A fifth explanation for lesbians’ higher unconditional earnings has to do with 
lesbians’ higher labor force attachment. It could simply be the case that lesbians earn 
more because they work more, both presently and over time in the past. Cushing-Daniels 
& Yeung (2009) find support for the idea that lesbians’ higher unconditional earnings are 
due in part to differences in labor supply: using General Social Survey data from 1988-
2006, they show that controlling for the selection into full-time work via a Heckman two-
stage selection model eliminates the gap between the wages of lesbians and straight 
women.  
Although the relationship between labor supply and wages for lesbians is only 
first starting to be addressed in the literature, we do know that lesbians as a whole do 
supply much more paid labor than their straight counterparts (Black et al. 2007a; Antecol 
& Steinberger 2011). There are several explanations for lesbians’ stronger labor force 
attachment and higher levels of labor supply. A rational expectations model to account 
for the choices of female workers, as shown by Badgett (1995), Berg & Lien (2002), 
Clain & Leppel (2002), and Black et al. (2003), posits that lesbians, knowing they are or 
will be partnered with another woman who also faces a gender-based wage disadvantage, 
invest more in their human capital and spend more time in the labor force to make up for 
13 
 
the lost household income of pairing two women instead of a woman with a higher-
earning man. Lesbians, the theory goes, work for pay more to make up for the economic 
cost of being a lesbian. A second explanation is that institutional constraints, such as the 
lack of federal employment non-discrimination protection, encourage lesbians to hold on 
tightly to their jobs once they have them. It could also be the case that lesbians receive 
less support from their family members and therefore need to work more for pay to 
ensure their own financial security (Badgett 2001; Giddings 2003). 
Building on the work of Leppel (2008) and Tebaldi & Elmslie (2006), Antecol & 
Steinberger (2011) analyzed the labor supply of lesbian versus straight women using 
2000 US Census data, concentrating on the role of children in explaining the sexual 
orientation labor supply gap. As a whole, lesbians supply much more labor than straight 
women at both the extensive margin (the decision to participate in the labor market at all) 
and the intensive margin (the number of hours worked, conditional on supplying some 
positive number of hours of labor).  Importantly, Antecol & Steinberger divide their 
sample into primary (higher) earner lesbians and secondary (lower) earner lesbians, and 
find that not only do the primary partners provide more labor than the secondary partners 
(who still provide more labor than straight women), but further that motherhood has less 
of an effect on the labor supply of lesbians than straight women and less on the labor 
supply of primary lesbians than on secondary lesbians. Children account for a much 
larger portion of the mean labor supply gap between (straight) married women and 
secondary lesbian earners (56%) than between (straight) married women and primary 
lesbian earners (15%); straight women’s labor supply is more similar to one group of 
lesbians (the secondary earners) than another (the primary earners). A parallel story 
14 
 
emerges when the sample of lesbians is split into the primary and secondary group using 
a definition of primary and secondary based on the household roster – the householder (or 
first person listed on the survey) is the primary partner, while her “unmarried partner” is 
the secondary partner. Motherhood has a very different effect on the labor supplies of 
primary versus secondary lesbians, wherein the secondary lesbians respond to children 
being present in the household in a manner much more similar to straight married women 
than the primary lesbians (whose labor market supply looks much more like married 
men’s). These findings suggest that not only might lesbian couples engage in some 
degree of household specialization, but that given the relationship between labor supply 
and wages, we might expect the wages of the two groups of lesbians to be different as 
well.  
Furthermore there is reason to believe that motherhood might even be positively 
correlated with wages for lesbians – or at least, for the primary lesbians. If it is the 
presence of children which drives specialization in a couple (as purported by Becker, 
1981; 1991) and this is also true in lesbian couples (as the research by Giddings et 
al.2012 shows to be the case), then a lesbian couple having children would mean that one 
of the lesbians would be specializing in paid work while her partner does paid work only 
part-time or not at all, allowing the primary lesbian to allocate more energy (Becker 
1985) and time to her paid work, potentially resulting in a positive effect on her wages. 
Therefore motherhood may be positively correlated with wages for the primary group of 
lesbians, but perhaps negatively correlated with wages for the secondary group.  
Another reason to expect a positive relationship between motherhood and wages 
for (some) lesbians is that there could be a selection bias for higher-earning lesbians into 
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motherhood. It could be the case that higher-income lesbian couples are more likely to be 
mothers than relatively lower income straight couples (since conception of a child is, on 
average, more expensive for lesbian couples, and because higher earners are more likely 
to be able to keep custody of children from previous relationships) (Clain & Leppel 
2001). On the other hand, many lesbian mothers have children from previous 
heterosexual relationships, and lesbians who were previously married (to a man) earn less 
than never married lesbians (Daneshvary et al. 2009). Therefore it is not clear if we 
should expect a selection bias into motherhood for high earning lesbians.  
Overall, the existing knowledge on the wages of lesbians in the US leads to the 
prediction that the effect of motherhood on wages is at least less negative for some 
lesbians compared to straight women and potentially positive for others. Further, given 
differences in the labor supplies of the two groups of lesbians (Antecol & Steinberger 
2011), we could suspect that the two groups are different in terms of their wages, as well. 
The next section describes the data and methods used to test these hypotheses. 
 
Data and Models to Study the Sexual Orientation Wage Gap 
I use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) sample of the 
American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2010 for this analysis (Ruggles et al. 
2010). The ACS is a nationally representative survey of over one million households per 
year and is close to ideal for this study, because it provides extensive information on 
labor market outcomes such as annual earnings and time (hours and weeks) worked, as 
well as an abundance of demographic information such as age, race, education, and 
location. While the ACS does not ask direct questions about sexual orientation, the 
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demographic information provided by the survey allows for the identification of people in 
same-sex and different-sex couples: each household has a “householder”, and this 
householder states their relationship to every other person in the household. One of the 
relationship choices is “unmarried partner” and I identify any woman with a female 
“unmarried partner” as a lesbian. In order to reduce the probability of having the sample 
of same-sex couples contaminated by miscoded different-sex couples, I follow the 
suggestions of Black et al.(2007b) and Gates & Steinberger (2008) and drop any 
observation for which the householder or the householder’s spouse or partner has 
imputed values for his/her marital status and who mailed in their completed survey (see 
Gates & Steinberger 2008 for details on coding errors in the 2000 Census, which also 
applies to subsequent ACS data). This restriction reduces the amount of same-sex couples 
in our sample by about 20 percent, but it substantially reduces the chance of miscoding 
straight couples as same-sex couples.  
There are three important drawbacks to our identification of “lesbians” in the 
ACS. The first is that the sexual orientation of single people is unidentifiable, because we 
construct categories of sexual orientation based on the gender composition of one's 
relationship. Therefore, we can only study lesbians who are in a couple.
4
 Secondly, we 
can only identify lesbians in a particular type of couple: the householder and her partner. 
Because we only know the detailed relationship of each person in the household to the 
householder, we cannot know if there are couples in the household other than the primary 
couple. This means that a couple living in someone else’s household – one of their 
parents’ homes, or with friends, for example – is not identifiable as a couple in these data, 
                                                 
4
 While it is feasible that selection into partnership is correlated with wages and would therefore provide a 
biased sample (as Carpenter & Gates 2008 show is true of gay men and lesbians in California), it is not 
clear that the selection into partnership would be different for lesbians and straight women.  
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and therefore their sexual orientation is unknown. Third, many people are unlikely to use 
the expression “unmarried partner”, either because they do not understand it, or because 
they instead think of their partners as “boyfriends” or “girlfriends” – a less formal term 
than “unmarried partner”. Indeed, Badgett & Schneebaum (2008) find that in 2007 
Current Population Survey, there are about forty percent more same-sex couples when 
the respondents are asked about their cohabiting “boyfriend/girlfriend”, instead of an 
“unmarried partner”. Despite the drawbacks of who is included and excluded in our 
sample, the ACS is a very good dataset for this analysis because of its large sample size, 
representativeness, and abundance of demographic and economic information.  
I compare the wages of lesbians to straight married and cohabiting but unmarried 
women. I use both married and unmarried women in my sample of straight coupled 
women because it is not clear whether lesbian couples are more like married or unmarried 
straight women. The choice to get married can be correlated with unobservable 
characteristics, such as one’s level of happiness (cf. Stutzer & Frey 2005), which may be 
related to workplace outcomes. Because some lesbians would get married if they had the 
legal choice while others would choose to stay unmarried, I compare the group of 
lesbians to both the married and unmarried straight women to account for the possible 
unobservable similarities between lesbians and either group of straight women – although 
we cannot know from these data which of the lesbians would get married if they could.  
For the first OLS analysis and the DFL analysis described below, I split the 
sample of lesbians into primary and secondary partners in the same way as Antecol & 
Steinberger (2011), mentioned above. In the “earner” primary/secondary classification, 
the higher earner in a lesbian couple is considered the primary partner, while the lower 
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earner is the secondary earner. (In the 71 cases where both partners earn the same 
amount, neither is designated primary or secondary.) In the “household roster” 
classification, the person named as the householder is the primary partner, and her 
“unmarried partner” is the secondary partner.  
I identify a “mother” in two ways. The first definition of motherhood that I 
employ considers a woman in the household’s main couple a “mother” when there is a 
biological, adopted, step-, foster child, or child-in-law of the householder in the home, or 
a sibling, sibling-in-law, or other related (not specified) child under 18 in the household. 
In total, 28.2% of lesbians had this definition of motherhood applied to them. This is 
what I call the “related” classification for motherhood. The second classification, the 
“IPUMS” definition, gives any woman in a household’s main couple who IPUMS 
designated as having her own (probable) biological, adopted, or foster child in the home, 
the status of “mother.” Because the ACS data only gives the relationship of every person 
in the household’s relationship to the householder and not to everyone else, we cannot be 
sure of the exact relationship between the partner and any children in the household. The 
IPUMS data comes with a variable which identifies a “probable” mother, based on either 
a direct link between the householder and a person in the household she names as her 
child, or (for non-householders) the age difference between two people in the household 
(between 15 and 49 years), where the older person was ever-married, and the relationship 
to the householder of both of the people gives them a “plausible” mother-child 
connection. In lesbian couples, 27% of householders are given this motherhood status, 
while only 3% of the unmarried partners have it (see table 1.1).
5
 
                                                 
5
 Of course not all women without a child in the home are non-mothers; they may have children who are 
living outside of the home. However, the existing literature on the motherhood penalty shows that the 
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The outcome variable is the log of hourly wages, which I calculate by dividing the 
respondents’ annual earnings6 by how many hours they worked last year, which was 
calculated by multiplying the midpoint of the intervalled “weeks worked last year” 
variable by the respondent’s usual hours worked per week.  Incomes in the 99.5th 
percentile are top coded as the average of all incomes in the 99.5
th
 percentile in the 
respondent’s state. I limit my sample to women of typical working age, 18-64, who 
worked a positive number of hours in the last year and who earned more than $2/hour and 
less than $250/hour. I exclude any individuals with census bureau flagged value for any 
of the variables of interest from the sample. The sample comprises 276,246 married 
straight women with an average hourly wage of $22.14; 31,963 unmarried straight 
women with an average hourly wage of $16.57; and 3,152 lesbians with an average 
hourly wage of $25.16.  
 To analyze the difference in the wages of lesbians and straight women, I employ 
three econometric techniques. First, I perform ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
wages on education level, work experience
7
, race and ethnicity, region of residence and a 
dummy variable indicating residence in a city;
8
 25 dummy variables indicating 
occupation; four dummy variables indicating whether the woman is a mother or not and 
the age of her youngest child (0-5; 6-12; 13-17; 18+); the usual hours worked per week; 
and a dummy indicating participation in a same-sex (lesbian) couple for primary and 
                                                                                                                                                 
penalty is based mainly on the mother’s “responsibility” to take care of the young child and her resulting 
time out of the labor market, and the penalty is therefore largest when young children are present (e.g. 
Anderson et al. 2003). 
6
 More precisely, these earnings are all the wages, salaries, commissions, cash bonuses, tips, and other 
money income received from an employer over the last twelve months. Payments-in-kind or 
reimbursements for business expenses are not included. 
7
 Potential experience in calculated in the standard way: age-years of schooling-5. 
8
 A city is defined as a metropolitan area with at least 1 million people.  
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secondary lesbians
9
. In some specifications, the model is restricted to women working 
full-time (at least 39 hours per week) and the hours worked variable is excluded. The 
equation takes the form 
isisssis XY           (1.1) 
whereY is the log hourly wages for person i of sexual orientation and marital status group 
s (either primary lesbian, secondary lesbian, straight unmarried, or straight married),  is 
a vector of coefficients on the observable characteristics X described above, and  is an 
error term with the usual properties.  
All but one (Antecol et al. 2008) study of the sexual orientation wage gap in the 
US use a dummy variable for sexual orientation (and straight women’s marital status) to 
test the effect of sexual orientation on wages, and I follow this standard here. 
Additionally, I run the regression for the entire group of lesbians and straight women 
separately, in order to check for different returns to motherhood by sexual orientation and 
family status group. In other words, I examine whether level of motherhood plays a 
different role in the wages of lesbians vis-à-vis married straight women. While some 
studies have done this for some variables predicting women’s earnings (Badgett 1995 for 
work experience; Klawitter & Flatt 1998 for state and metropolitan status; Clain & 
Leppel 2001 for one region, one education level, one occupation; age; and presence of 
one’s own child in the household; Elmslie & Tebaldi 2007 for race and metropolitan 
status; and Daneshvary et al. 2009 for previous marriage), only Antecol et al. (2008) 
have presented separate models looking at returns of all observable characteristics to 
                                                 
9
 In the main analysis I present the results using the earner definition of primary/secondary, and the results 
with the household roster position definition of primary/secondary is used as a robustness check. Results 
are in the appendix.  
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wages. This strategy is particularly relevant in this study, because we are mainly 
interested in the varying effect of motherhood on wages for lesbians compared to straight 
women. The separate regressions are followed up with a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  
The Oaxaca-Blinder (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) technique decomposes the 
wage gap between lesbians and straight women (at the mean) into differences in 
observable characteristics and differences in returns to these characteristics. The 
decomposition allows us to see whether the wage gap is due to the fact that lesbians have 
different characteristics, or if they experience different returns to these characteristics. 
Intuitively, the process is asking what lesbians would earn if they faced the same returns 
to their observable characteristics as straight women. It can be modeled as 
  ̅    ̅  (  ̅̅ ̅    ̅̅̅̅ ) 
    ̅̅ ̅(     )  (     )   (1.2) 
for sexual orientation groups L (lesbian) and S (straight).  
Finally, while the Oaxaca-Blinder technique provides us with much insight about 
the returns of various characteristics to lesbians and straight women, it only analyses the 
relative importance of these characteristics at the mean of the wage gap. It is feasible 
(and indeed shown by Antecol et al. 2008) that the sexual orientation wage gap differs 
along the earnings distribution. For example, Antecol et al. (2008) show that the lesbian 
wage premium is lower at the higher end of the earnings distribution – the difference 
between lesbian and straight women’s earnings is lower for high wage earners than for 
lower wage earners. We might expect that the effect of motherhood on lesbians’ wages 
would differ along the earnings distribution. As discussed above, Clain & Leppel (2001) 
posit that there can a selection bias into motherhood; women with higher earnings might 
be more likely to self-select into motherhood, and they are also more likely to retain 
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custody of children from prior relationships. If this is more true for lesbians than straight 
women, we could expect that the lesbian wage premium once controlling for motherhood 
would be higher at the higher end of the wage distribution. I test this possibility using a 
DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux (DFL) (1996) decomposition, which allows us to see the impact 
of various characteristics on a wage gap between two groups at all points along the 
earnings distribution.  
The DFL tool works by creating a counterfactual distribution of wages for 
lesbians as if they had the same distribution of observable characteristics as straight 
women. In other words, it allows us to model the distribution of wages that would prevail 
for lesbian workers if they had the distribution of characteristics for straight women. One 
creates this counterfactual distribution by reweighting the lesbian observations by 
 ( )  
    ( )
    ( )
          
or equivalently,  
  ( )  
  (    | )    (    )
  (    | )    (    )
          (1.3) 
which can be easily computed by estimating a probability model (via logit, for example) 
to predict   (    | )(the probability of being straight given the characteristics in  ) 
and   (    | ) (the probability of being a lesbian, given  ), and using the predicted 
probabilities to compute a value for  ( )for each lesbian observation (Fortin et al. 2010). 
Once the lesbian observations are weighted using the covariates of interest, any 
difference left between the wages of lesbians and straight women is unexplained by the 
observable characteristics included in constructing the counterfactual distribution of 
lesbians’ wages, and any remaining difference between the wages of straight women and 
the counterfactual wages of lesbians can be understood as the effect of being a lesbian.  
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 There is some concern about the order in which covariates are introduced into the 
weighting scheme in the DFL approach. The concern first introduced in DFL (1996) and 
in several applications of the technique thereafter (including e.g. Antecol et al. 2008) 
arises when creating the reweighting measure  ( )by sequentially adding covariates, e.g. 
starting with   (    |  ), computing   (  ) and the counterfactual distribution of 
wages for lesbians based only on   , then doing the same with   (    |     ), and so 
on. The problem with this approach is that it ignores any relationship between covariates 
introduced earlier with those which come later, despite the fact that there maybe an 
economic interpretation for their relationship. For example, estimating the effect of 
region without controlling for other covariates, such as residence in a city, might be 
overstated if people in one region tend to be concentrated into cities, where wages are 
higher than in rural areas. The problem of sequentially adding covariates, then, can be 
understood as an omitted variable problem, because estimates based on the first few 
covariates leave out the relevance of the covariates which are introduced later (Gelbach 
2009).   
Fortin et al.(2010) suggest an alternative approach, appropriate mainly for 
studying the effect of one variable of interest – perfect in our case, where we are 
concerned with understanding the effect of motherhood on the lesbian wage premium 
(Fortin et al. 2010, pp. 80-2).In this approach, I first calculate the reweighting factor 
using all covariates,  ( ). For covariate of interest  , in this case motherhood, I then 
calculate the reweighting factor using all covariates except  ,     (   ). Finally, I 
compute the counterfactual distribution of wages using the ratio of the reweighting 
factors 
  
    (   ) 
 as a weight, and compare this weighted distribution to the 
24 
 
counterfactual obtained using only    as a weight. The difference in the two is the 
estimated contribution of covariate   (motherhood) to the composite effect of the 
covariates in the lesbian versus straight wage distribution.  
 
Empirical Results 
What contributes to the difference in the wages of straight women and lesbians as 
a group? I test the relative importance of differences in occupation, educational 
attainment, work experience, location, race and ethnicity, hours worked, and motherhood 
status on lesbian versus straight women’s wages. The means for log hourly wages and all 
independent variables by sexual orientation and family status (married or unmarried) are 
shown in Table 1.1.  
In an unconditional comparison of wages, lesbians as a whole (column 3) clearly 
earn more than straight women, but the gap is much larger between lesbians and 
unmarried straight women (43.9%) than between lesbians and married straight women 
(10.4%).
10
 Once we divide the group of lesbians in primary and secondary groups, 
though, we see a more nuanced story. The primary lesbian earners (column 4) earn 58.7% 
more than married straight women, while the secondary lesbian earners (column 5) make 
15.3% less than straight married women. Using the household roster definition of primary 
and secondary does not show the same contrast; both groups earn more than straight 
women.  
Lesbians as a whole work significantly more hours per week than straight married 
and unmarried women (40.7 versus 37.1 and 37.8, respectively) and more weeks per year. 
                                                 
10
 Throughout the paper, the log differences in outcomes are converted to percentage terms using the 
equation  where  is the log difference between the lesbian and straight outcomes.  
25 
 
Both primary and secondary lesbians work more than straight women, but there is a 
statistically significant (though small) difference in the weeks worked by primary and 
secondary (using the earner definition) lesbians. Using the “related” definition of 
motherhood, we see that a much lower percentage of lesbians have children (28 percent 
compared to 69 percent of straight married women and 42 percent of straight unmarried 
women). The IPUMS definition of motherhood yields much lower rates of 
“motherhood.” Lesbians are more likely to have professional degrees than married 
straight women (6.8% versus 3.7%) and much more likely to have these degrees than 
unmarried straight women (1.7%), and there is a lower percentage of Hispanic lesbians 
(10.0%) than in any other sexual orientation and marital status group (10.8% of straight 
married; 15.5% of straight unmarried). These differences help explain lesbians’ higher 
earnings in unconditional comparisons. Primary lesbian earners are also more highly 
educated and more of them are white and non-Hispanic, compared to their lower-earning 
partners.  
 The results of the OLS regressions of equation (1) are presented in Tables 1.2-1.4. 
The first column of Table 1.2 shows the effect of sexual orientation (divided by primary 
and secondary earners) and motherhood status on hourly wages for the complete sample 
of lesbians and married straight women.
11
 The third column does the same but only for 
the sample of full time workers (those who usually work at least 39 hours per week), 
representing the form of regression that has often been presented in the literature as 
predicting the effect of sexual orientation on wages for women. Columns 2 and 4 add the 
effect of motherhood on both the straight women and the primary and secondary lesbians 
                                                 
11
 Estimates for the relationship between education level, experience, region, metropolitan status, 
race and ethnicity were included in the model, but results are not reported here. They are 
available upon request.  
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to the analysis, where motherhood is captured in dummy variables indicating whether the 
woman is a mother and the age of her youngest child. For the sample of all women (those 
who work any number of positive hours, not just full time), I add a control for the usual 
number of hours worked per week simultaneously with the dummy variables for 
motherhood, as theory predicts that these effects work together. All of the models control 
for potential past work experience flexibly, using four terms for it, but aside from the 
sample of full-time workers, I only control for current participation in the labor market 
once accounting for motherhood status (column 2), because motherhood and labor market 
supply are jointly determined for women.  
 First comparing column 3 to the existing literature makes the first important point 
in this analysis.
12
 Although most studies have found a positive relationship between 
wages and participation in a lesbian couple for full-time workers, dividing the sample of 
lesbians into primary and secondary earners paints a much more nuanced story (column 
3). One group of lesbians, the primary earners, enjoys a wage premium over married 
straight women of almost 18 percent. The secondary lesbians, however, face a 12 percent 
wage disadvantage, or penalty. These results provide an immediate indication that 
important differences within the group of lesbians had been missed before. 
 Including motherhood into the equation for full time workers (column 4) shows 
that there is a motherhood wage penalty for straight mothers with children of every age 
above 5, but not for mothers with children between birth and five years old, which is 
surprising and may be due to the selection bias into motherhood mentioned above. 
Looking at the motherhood effect for lesbians shows that there is a positive relationship 
                                                 
12
 The models in tables 1.2 and 1.3 included controls for race, ethnicity, education, region, metropolitan 
status, and occupation but were left out of the tables for brevity. Results are available upon request.  
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between being the mother of a small (0-5) child for the primary lesbians. The effect of 
children on secondary lesbians, however, is no different than it is on straight women. A 
similar story emerges when looking at women who work any positive number of hours 
(column 2), but here there no extra positive relationship between motherhood and wages 
for primary earners. All women in this sample appear to have a slight motherhood 
premium when the youngest child is between zero and five, but face a penalty at all other 
stages at the youngest child’s life. The extra positive relationship between motherhood 
and wages for primary lesbian mothers of children aged zero to five resembles the 
fatherhood wage premium (the “daddy bonus”) that has been observed in the literature 
for straight men (Lundberg & Rose 2000; Budig & Hodges 2010).    
 Turning now to a similar analysis of lesbians versus unmarried straight women 
(Table 1.3), we see a similar trend in the results. Primary earning lesbians working full 
time enjoy a 26 percent wage premium over unmarried straight women with similar 
demographic characteristics, and secondary earning lesbians do slightly worse than 
unmarried straight women, facing an 7.8 percent wage penalty. Motherhood has a 
negative relationship with wages for straight women and secondary lesbian earners 
whose children are less than 13, but there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between motherhood and wages for primary lesbian earners. The parallel 
analysis of all workers (columns 1 and 2) shows that controlling for motherhood and 
hours worked results in a fall of the lesbian wage premium from 29 to 25 percentage 
points for primary earners and an increase in the wage penalty from 12 to 13 percent for 
secondary earners. There is a negative relationship between wages and motherhood for 
straight and secondary lesbian mothers whose youngest child is under 13, and a positive 
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relationship between motherhood and wages for primary earning lesbian mothers whose 
children are under 13. The    measure of the goodness of fit for the models presented in 
both Tables 1.2 and 1.3 is quite high for a wage regression; the variables included in the 
analysis explain between 34 and 38 percent of the difference between the mean wages of 
lesbians and straight women. 
 To compare the effect of various characteristics on the wages of the women in 
different sexual orientation and family status groups, I run separate wage regressions for 
the entire group of lesbians, married straight women, and unmarried straight women. The 
results of these separate OLS wage regressions are presented in Table 1.4. Most of the 
results are common and expected: higher number of hours worked per week, having more 
working experience, living in the northeast or the west, living in a city, and having higher 
education levels are correlated with higher wages; being black or another race other than 
white and living in the South is correlated with lower wages. Some characteristics 
correlate with wages differently by sexual orientation and family status: married straight 
women with a Ph.D. or professional degree earned higher returns to these degrees than 
lesbians (a difference of 23.3 percentage points; 8.3 percentage points for unmarried 
straight women), and the (negative) return to being black is 3.4 (0.4) percentage points 
higher for lesbians than for straight married (unmarried) women.  
The effect of motherhood differs by sexual orientation and family status as well: 
being a mother has a strong positive relationship with wages for lesbians (especially for 
those with children under six), a negative relationship with wages for unmarried straight 
women (especially for those with children under 13), and a negative relationship with 
straight married women’s wages, except for those with a child under 6, where there is a 
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surprisingly positive relationship with wages. As discussed above, the positive relation 
between motherhood and wages for lesbians may be the case because of lesbians’ 
selection into motherhood (higher earning women may be more willing and able to 
become mothers, and may be more able to keep or receive custody of their children). 
Furthermore, lesbians are more likely than straight women to have a partner who is the 
primary care-take for the child. Lesbian mothers are more likely than straight mothers to 
be able to specialize in market work, because of their partners’ gender. 
To study which characteristics contribute to the mean lesbian wage premium and 
how relatively important they are, the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition are 
presented in Table 1.5. Compared to married straight women, about the same amount of 
the lesbian premium comes from higher endowments of observable characteristics and 
the returns to those characteristics. As Antecol et al. (2008) also found, it is mainly 
differences in education levels which drives the difference in the wages of lesbians and 
straight married women. Lesbians’ lower level of potential work experience (due to the 
fact that they are, on average, younger) has a negative relationship with their wages.  
Most of the wage premium experienced by lesbians over unmarried straight 
women is attributable to differences in their endowments. Indeed these differences make 
up more than 90 percent of the earnings difference between lesbians and straight 
unmarried women (.333/.365). The main characteristics that drive the difference between 
the wages of lesbians and straight unmarried women are the difference in usual hours 
worked and the different ethnic composition of the two samples. Further, the returns to 
motherhood play an important role in lesbians’ higher wages; the returns to motherhood, 
which are positive for lesbians, have much to do with lesbians’ higher earnings.   
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We now move to a decomposition analysis of our independent variables of 
interest on the straight-lesbian wage gap using the DFL counterfactual, which allows us 
to see the wage gap along all points of the wage distribution and see the effect of 
motherhood on the wage gap in this way as well. Here I use the “related” definition of 
motherhood. (The results using the “IPUMS” motherhood variable are in the appendix 
and are largely the same, because the two definitions of motherhood do not change much 
in the straight samples and the lesbian sample is weighted by the probability of having 
straight characteristics.) Figure 1 shows the wage gap between lesbians and straight 
married women, with and without weighting the lesbian sample by the weight in equation 
(1.3) above, which takes into account motherhood status, hours worked, occupation, 
experience, education, race and ethnicity, region, and metropolitan status. The top panel 
shows the wage gap between primary lesbian partners and straight married women, while 
the bottom panel shows the gap between secondary lesbian partners and straight married 
women. The graphs on the left of both panels use the earnings definition of primary 
versus secondary partner, and the graphs on the right hand side use the household roster 
definition. 
The dashed blue line shows the (unconditional) wage gap between lesbians and 
married straight women without controlling for any of these characteristics. Here our 
expectations for the primary partners are confirmed: the unconditional gap shows that 
primary lesbians earn about 30-40 percent more than straight women over most of the 
wage distribution using the earner definition of primary and secondary, and between ten 
and 20 percent using the household roster definition. On the other hand, the wages of the 
secondary lesbians are generally lower than those of the primary lesbian partners: 
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between 10 and 20 percent lower using the earner definition of secondary, and about .5 
percent higher by the household roster definition. 
 Creating a counterfactual distribution of wages allows us to see the effect of being 
a lesbian, as we create this counterfactual by assigning both primary and secondary 
lesbians the same distribution of characteristics as straight women. Any gap in the actual 
distribution of wages for straight women and this counterfactual distribution is due to the 
effect of being a lesbian. All panels of figure 2 present the gap between married straight 
women’s earnings and the counterfactual lesbian earnings (solid red line), and we can see 
that taking the observable characteristics discussed above into account does lower the 
lesbian wage premium for primary lesbians over most of the distribution, and increases 
the size of the lesbian wage penalty for the secondary lesbian partners.  
How does motherhood relate to wages for these groups of women? The dotted 
green line shows us the contribution of motherhood to the composite effect of being a 
lesbian on the wage gap. Motherhood is positively related to wages for the group of 
primary lesbians, where we see that the highest earning primary lesbians experience the 
strongest positive relationship between motherhood and their wages. Aside from the very 
highest earning secondary lesbian partners, though, motherhood is negatively related to 
wages for the lesbians in this group – especially the lowest earning ones. Motherhood is 
good for the wages of one group of lesbians, and bad for the other. 
This result makes sense in the contexts of the literature on household 
specialization. Although we had always observed a lesbian wage premium in the past, 
this analysis shows only some lesbians receive a lesbian wage premium – and it is so 
strong for that group of lesbians, that the lesbian penalty faced by the other half of the 
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lesbian population was being overshadowed. While this analysis does not test for this 
possibility explicitly, one explanation for the vastly different effect of motherhood on the 
two groups of lesbian’s wages is that there might be household specialization in lesbian 
couples. If one of the women in a lesbian couple does more paid work when there is a 
child in the household and the other woman does less, this fact would be reflected in their 
wages. Indeed, the differences in the outcomes for primary and secondary lesbians 
parallels the story found in different-sex couples: the presence of children is generally 
negatively correlated with mother’s wages, but positively correlated with father’s wages 
(Lundberg & Rose 2000; Hodges & Budig 2010).  
 Comparing lesbians to unmarried straight women presents us with a story with 
one interesting similarity and one interesting difference. In figure 2 we see the large 
unconditional wage gap (dashed line) of about 60 percent between primary earner 
lesbians and unmarried straight women; the primary lesbians using the household roster 
definition have an unconditional wage advantage between 20 and 50 percent. The 
secondary earners also have an unconditional wage advantage over straight unmarried 
women: they earn up to 40 percent more using the household roster definition of 
secondary. 
 Using the same tools of analysis as above with the straight married women, we 
see that accounting for differences in observable characteristics eliminates much of the 
lesbian wage premium, and as in the case of lesbians compared to straight unmarried 
women, it results in a lesbian wage penalty for the secondary lesbians. Compared to 
straight unmarried women, there is a wage penalty for being a lesbian for the secondary 
lesbians between 0 and 40 percent. This lesbian penalty is lower at higher points along 
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the wage distribution. The group of primary lesbians exhibits a wage premium over 
unmarried straight women, ranging from zero to 20 percent. 
 Examining the effect of motherhood on the lesbian-straight unmarried wage gap, 
we see an interesting difference from the lesbian-straight married wage gap story. In the 
latter, motherhood was negatively related to wages for the group of secondary lesbians 
(the dotted green line was below zero). However, for both primary and secondary 
lesbians, the effect of motherhood on wages is positive for lesbians compared to straight 
unmarried women. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in Table 1.5 showed that there are 
high positive returns to motherhood for lesbians compared to unmarried straight women 
at the mean, but this analysis shows that to be true across the entire wage distribution. 
One explanation for this finding is that selection into motherhood is positively related to 
wages for lesbians, but possibly negatively related to wages for unmarried straight 
women, perhaps because selection into motherhood for straight unmarried women may 
be associated with unplanned pregnancy.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The empirical analysis in this paper shows that accounting for all observable 
characteristics, including motherhood status, presents a more nuanced story of the 
lesbian-straight wage gap than the one that presently exists in the literature on the 
economics of sexual orientation. It shows that there are two distinct groups of lesbians, 
one of whom enjoys a strong wage premium over straight women, while the other suffers 
from a wage penalty for being a lesbian. Compared to unmarried straight women, 
motherhood is positively associated with all lesbian’s wages, but only primary lesbians 
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experience a positive relationship between motherhood and wages when compared to 
straight married women. Motherhood is negatively correlated with wages for the group of 
secondary lesbians, perhaps because the secondary partner specializes in care of the child. 
Future research on the economic lives of lesbians should consider the possibility that as 
in different-sex couples, one member of a lesbian couple may be faring better in the labor 
market than her partner.  
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Table 1.1: Means for variables of interest, by sexual orientation and family status 
 
 
Variable
Married 
Straight 
(1)
Unmarried 
Straight 
(2)
Lesbian             
(3)
Primary              
(4)
Secondary 
(5)
Primary                     
(6)
Secondary
(7)
Log Hourly Wage 2.866** 2.601** 2.965 3.228 2.724** 3.013 2.913**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Log Hourly Wage Gap 0.099 0.364 
Percent Mothers - Related 62.87** 41.88** 28.27 27.43 28.64 29.07 27.18 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Percent Mothers - IPUMS 62.02** 29.16** 15.69 16.60 14.63 26.98 3.14**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006)
Potential Experience 23.78** 14.99** 20.11 19.93 20.18 20.53 19.65*
(0.025) (0.074) (0.219) (0.316) (0.312) (0.302) (0.318)
Average Hours/Week 37.05** 37.75** 40.68 41.25 40.18* 41.08 40.24*
(0.024) (0.065) (0.211) (0.301) (0.308) (0.313) (0.280)
Weeks Worked Last Year 46.43* 45.62** 46.90 47.19 46.46 47.08 46.70 
(0.024) (0.082) (0.230) (0.324) (0.338) (0.325) (0.324)
Education (%)
   Less than HS 5.07** 8.39** 2.53 1.54 3.23* 2.36 2.71 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.032) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
   HS graduate 42.92** 54.23** 36.92 31.50 40.68** 34.99 39.05*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
   Associate's Degree 11.32** 10.29* 8.79 8.59 9.10 8.68 8.91 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
   Bachelor's Degree 24.80** 19.61** 28.00 28.96 27.81 28.87 27.04 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
   Master's Degree 12.22** 5.79** 16.95 20.31 14.29** 17.97 15.83 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
   Professional/Doctorate 3.65** 1.69** 6.81 9.10 4.89** 7.12 6.46
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Race (%)
   White 82.66 79.18** 83.93 85.58 82.79* 84.18 83.66 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
   Black 6.65** 9.51 8.58 7.47 9.30 9.02 8.09 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
   Other 10.69** 11.30** 7.49 6.95 7.90 6.80 8.26 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Ethnicity (%)
   Hispanic 10.78 15.50** 10.00 9.80 10.47 8.85 11.27*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Region (%)
   Northeast 18.04* 18.76 19.88 19.75 19.51 20.04 19.72 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
   Midwest 25.04** 24.81** 20.89 21.24 20.65 21.03 20.72 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
   South 35.36* 32.06 33.68 33.76 34.18 34.04 33.28 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
   West 21.55* 24.38 25.55 25.25 25.66 24.89 26.28 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Metropolitan Status
   Lives in City 50.11** 51.36** 58.69 58.23 57.76 58.64 58.74
(0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 276246 31963 3152 1459 1622 1643 1509 
Lesbian Division: 
Earner Definition
Lesbian Division: 
Roster DefinitionSexual Orientation/Marital Status
Notes: In columns 1 and 2 a statistically significant difference in means, relative to column 3, is indicated 
by * (p<.10) or ** (p<.01). Differences between columns 4 versus 5 and 6 versus 7 are indicated in the 
same way.
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Table 1.2: OLS predicting log hourly wages with earner classification of 
primary/secondary, lesbians versus straight married women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All All 
Full-Time 
Workers
Full-Time 
Workers
Lesbian Primary Earner 0.203*** 0.176*** 0.165*** 0.148***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lesbian Secondary Earner -0.157*** -0.176*** -0.130*** -0.135***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother 0-5 0.038*** 0.043***
(0.00) (0.00)
Mother 6-12 -0.030*** -0.010**
(0.00) (0.00)
Mother 13-17 -0.028*** -0.019***
(0.00) (0.00)
Mother 18+ -0.025*** -0.032***
(0.00) (0.00)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Primary 0.081 0.123**
(0.06) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Primary 0.084 0.072
(0.05) (0.05)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Primary -0.043 -0.027
(0.08) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Primary 0.039 0.016
(0.06) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Secondary -0.007 -0.000
(0.06) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Secondary 0.076 0.020
(0.06) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Secondary 0.103 0.137
(0.09) (0.09)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Secondary -0.041 -0.052
(0.10) (0.14)
Usual Hours Worked 0.003***
(0.00)
Constant 2.378*** 2.253*** 2.341*** 2.346***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 279398 279398 178870 178870
R-squared 0.342 0.346 0.379 0.380
Notes: Author's calculation on 2010 ACS data. Standard errors in parentheses. Results for 
occupation, race, ethnicity, region, metropolitan status, education, and potential experience not 
shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1).
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Table 1.3: OLS predicting log hourly wages with earner classification of primary/ 
secondary, lesbians versus straight unmarried women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All All 
Full-Time 
Workers
Full-Time 
Workers
Lesbian Primary Earner 0.252*** 0.227*** 0.232*** 0.201***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lesbian Secondary Earner -0.123*** -0.140*** -0.081*** -0.097***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother 0-5 -0.037*** -0.049***
(0.01) (0.01)
Mother 6-12 -0.045*** -0.062***
(0.01) (0.01)
Mother 13-17 0.008 0.009
(0.02) (0.02)
Mother 18+ 0.029 0.024
(0.02) (0.02)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Primary 0.156* 0.219***
(0.06) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Primary 0.111* 0.126*
(0.05) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Primary -0.072 -0.056
(0.08) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Primary -0.015 -0.037
(0.07) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Secondary 0.072 0.083
(0.06) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Secondary 0.098 0.076
(0.06) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Secondary 0.061 0.091
(0.09) (0.09)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Secondary -0.113 -0.123
(0.10) (0.14)
Usual Hours Worked 0.000
(0.00)
Constant 2.356*** 2.345*** 2.372*** 2.375***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 35115 35115 23400 23400
R-squared 0.376 0.377 0.397 0.399
Notes: Author's calculation on 2010 ACS data. Standard errors in parentheses. Results for 
occupation, race, ethnicity, region, metropolitan status, education, and potential experience not 
shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1).
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Table 1.4: Separate OLS regressions by household type 
 
Straight Married
Straight  
Unmarried Lesbian
Mother 0-5 0.0367*** -0.0433*** 0.121**
(8.57) (-4.31) (2.77)
Mother 6-12 -0.0302*** -0.0448*** 0.0318
(-7.82) (-3.73) (0.80)
Mother 13-17 -0.0275*** 0.0138 -0.0345
(-6.77) (0.85) (-0.61)
Mother 18+ -0.0244*** 0.0371* -0.0905
(-6.34) (2.26) (-1.31)
Experience 0.0619*** 0.0858*** 0.0850***
(24.13) (19.62) (4.52)
Experience^2 -0.280*** -0.480*** -0.327*
(-14.72) (-12.35) (-2.07)
Experience^3 0.0570*** 0.116*** 0.0594
(10.37) (9.05) (1.16)
Experience^4 -0.00428*** -0.00972*** -0.00402
(-7.89) (-7.03) (-0.73)
Usual Hours Worked 0.00298*** -0.0000551 0.00409*
(19.36) (-0.11) (2.54)
Less Than High School -0.207*** -0.249*** -0.254**
(-31.16) (-17.48) (-3.16)
Associate's Degree 0.128*** 0.159*** 0.0928*
(30.91) (13.62) (2.11)
Bachelor's Degree 0.327*** 0.369*** 0.353***
(89.63) (35.55) (11.20)
Master's Degree 0.562*** 0.571*** 0.481***
(119.56) (35.18) (11.10)
Doctoral/Professional Degree 0.750*** 0.703*** 0.661***
(90.77) (23.51) (12.14)
Black -0.0258*** -0.0565*** -0.0613
(-4.94) (-4.48) (-1.16)
Other Race -0.0483*** -0.0301* -0.0108
(-10.57) (-2.43) (-0.24)
Hispanic -0.0719*** -0.0589*** -0.00704
(-15.74) (-5.29) (-0.18)
New England 0.109*** 0.117*** 0.0761*
(29.10) (11.20) (2.18)
West 0.101*** 0.114*** 0.0954**
(26.76) (10.95) (2.86)
South -0.0105*** 0.00908 -0.0370
(-3.32) (0.97) (-1.15)
City 0.149*** 0.144*** 0.207***
(59.10) (20.19) (9.19)
Constant 2.268*** 2.169*** 2.005***
(0.0135) (0.0281) (0.105)
R-squared 0.344 0.351 0.441
Notes: Author's calculation on ACS 2010 data. Results for 25 occupational 
categories not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition for lesbian versus straight married and 
unmarried log hourly wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Log Hourly Wage Gap
endowments returns endowments returns
Portion Due To… 0.0549*** 0.0442** 0.333*** 0.0313*
(0.0154) (0.0176) (0.0153) (0.0167)
   Motherhood -0.00277 0.0511 0.0182*** 0.142**
(0.0104) (0.0593) (0.00488) (0.0628)
   Usual Hours Worked 0.0225*** -0.0218 0.137*** -0.0280**
(0.00594) (0.0156) (0.00993) (0.0137)
   Education 0.0612*** -0.00196 0.00187 -0.00178
(0.00633) (0.00657) (0.00201) (0.00810)
   Race -0.000625 0.0109** 0.000402 0.0100
(0.00187) (0.00428) (0.00217) (0.00636)
   Ethnicity 5.70e-05 0.279*** 0.134*** 0.124*
(0.000311) (0.0741) (0.00889) (0.0682)
   Experience -0.0611*** 0.0217* 0.0149*** 0.0283**
(0.00671) (0.0118) (0.00279) (0.0126)
   City 0.0175*** -0.0196 0.00114 -0.0332
(0.00291) (0.0217) (0.00162) (0.0226)
   Region 0.00554*** -0.0211 0.0381*** -0.0778***
(0.00190) (0.0238) (0.00482) (0.0275)
   Occupation 0.0127*** -0.031 0.027*** -0.130***
(0.00310) (0.023) (0.002) (0.106)
Straight Married           
versus Lesbian
Straight Unmarried       
versus Lesbian
Source: Author's calculation on ACS 2010 data. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
0.099***
(0.015)
0.365***
(0.016)
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Figure 1: DFL comparing lesbians and straight married women 
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Figure 2: DFL comparing lesbians and straight unmarried women 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HOUSEHOLD DIVISION OF LABOR IN SAME-SEX COUPLES 
 
Introduction 
The sexual division of labor in a household, in which men perform the bulk of the 
paid work and women perform the bulk of unpaid work, is one of the key items of inquiry 
in the fields of labor and feminist economics. It has been cited as a fundamental 
explanation of the difference in men and women’s economic lives, and it is a critical part 
of people’s daily experiences. Hartmann (1981b), among others, considers the sexual 
division of labor the crucial link between capitalism and male dominance. Folbre (1994, 
see especially p. 48) points out that the sexual division of labor is an important institution 
(a “means of coordinating the activities of individuals and groups” (p. 48)) in economic 
and social life and a main channel through which men and women’s economic lives are 
determined. But does the economic and social importance of the sexual division of labor 
necessarily mean that a couple’s division of labor is always based on sex? Does it mean 
that same-sex couples do not exhibit a systematic division of labor, wherein the 
characteristics of the people in a couple are related to the type of work that they do?  
  Empirical analyses of time spent by people in couples in the US consistently 
show that on average, women married to men perform twice as much unpaid household 
labor as their husbands (Robinson & Godbey 1997; Coltrane 2000; Bianchi et al. 2000; 
Artis & Pavalko 2003). In different-sex couples, a person’s sex is the main determinant of 
his or her specialization into paid or unpaid work. In same-sex couples, however, the 
story is not so clear. The people in same-sex couples may not specialize in paid or unpaid 
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work based on their sex, but that does not mean that the couple does not find some 
systematic mechanism to assign work roles in the household. As we will see, there is 
good reason to think that same-sex couples may also engage in a household division of 
labor, where one couple member performs more of the paid work, while the other does 
more of the unpaid care work and household work.  
This paper draws on the theoretical and empirical developments in economics and 
other social sciences which show that same-sex couples might and indeed sometimes do 
engage in a division of labor, and further asks the following: if same-sex couples do not 
make specialization decisions based on the sex of its members, upon what lines do they 
make decisions about work? 
 
Theoretical Background 
The existing literature on the economics of the household has addressed the sexual 
division of labor in different-sex couples rather extensively and the phenomenon is 
already quite well theorized from both neoclassical and heterodox perspectives. To a 
large extent, these theories can be extended to same-sex couples with some 
modification.
13
  
 The most influential economist to theorize the household division of labor has 
been Gary Becker. In his eminent works “A Theory of the Allocation of Time” (1965) 
and A Treatise on the Family (1991), Becker offers his explanation of how people in 
different-sex couples divide their working time into household and care work versus 
                                                 
13
 Badgett (1995, p. 123) warns against blindly applying the models built and mainly used to analyze 
different-sex couples to a study of same-sex couples, in part based on concerns that in doing so, economists 
can “overlook the important legal, political, and cultural differences that shape the economic position and 
behavior of families formed by lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.” Her point is well-taken, and the 
extensions to the models which I suggest here try to take those differences into account.  
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labor market work to maximize household efficiency. As households need to perform 
both household and labor market work but have limited time accomplish all tasks, it is in 
their best interest to produce as efficiently as possible. Based on the theory of 
comparative advantages – that people with different skills should specialize in particular 
(different) tasks and then trade in order to maximize their joint productivity – and 
Becker’s assertion that biological differences between the sexes give women an 
advantage in household and care work while men have an advantage in labor market 
work, it follows that different-sex couples should engage in a sexual division of labor to 
increase efficiency.  
Biological differences and the presence of children play the key roles in Becker’s 
theory: supposing that men and women start with equal marginal productivities in paid 
work, the time away from the labor market to bear, care for, and raise children lowers 
women’s marginal productivity in paid work relative to men’s, and since wages are set 
equal to a worker’s marginal productivity in this model, women’s wages subsequently 
decline relative to their male partner’s wages over time. In other words, because women 
bear children, they must take time away from the labor market, which leads to them 
earning less money. The initial divergence in men and women’s wages created by child 
bearing is further accentuated by related variation in human capital investment: since they 
know that they will do more paid work over their lifetimes, men spend more time in 
school and on-the-job training than women do. These higher investments in education 
and on-the-job training further increase men’s marginal productivity, widening the gap 
between the wages of men and women (Becker 1991, chapter 2).  
The comparative advantage model also accommodates the possibility that women 
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would continue labor market work after having a child. In this case, women would 
continue to do household work because of their comparative advantage in it, developed 
shortly after childbirth. Although she is better at this work than her male partner, the 
work still drains her energy and leaves her to choose a paid job compatible with 
household and care work, the work she in which she has an advantage (Becker 1985; 
Becker 1991). Becker therefore suggests that mothers would be more likely than non-
mothers to work in jobs which require less energy or which have parent-friendly 
characteristics, such as flexible hours and few demands for travel or nonstandard shifts. 
Becker suggests that parent-friendly jobs are lower paid, although there seems to be 
evidence against that assertion in the literature (Budig & Hodges 2010). If the paid jobs 
that mothers chose were indeed lower paid than men’s jobs, mothers’ comparative 
advantage in non-market work would become even more pronounced. 
In sum, the comparative advantage model says that both household and labor 
market work need to be performed, and that couples maximize their efficiency in doing 
that work by having each member of the couple specialize where their respective 
comparative advantages lie: women in household and care work and men in labor market 
work. Becker’s model depends on biological differences among men and women and the 
presence of children (or the potential for children) as the foundations of the model. 
Indeed, he wrote that “households with only men or only women are less efficient 
because they are unable to profit from the sexual difference in comparative advantage” 
(1991, pp. 38-9).  
However, we can go beyond assuming that it is only difference in biological sex 
which can create comparative advantages, even in households with children. The lack of 
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difference in biological sex does not exclude same-sex couples with children from 
gaining efficiency via specialization (Badgett 1995; Badgett 2001). An obvious example 
of this possibility is the case of lesbian couples in which one member of the couple is a 
biological mother of the couple’s child; the biological parents should, according to 
Becker, have a comparative advantage in household and care work. Indeed in any case in 
which one member of the couple is “better” at household/care work or labor market work 
vis-à-vis their partner, the couple should specialize to increase efficiency. Badgett (2001, 
p. 130-1) says that “[g]iven differences in education, upbringing, and tastes… it seems 
likely that gay individuals’ marginal products in home and market production vary, 
making comparative advantage of potential equal relevance for same-sex households.” 
Cases in which comparative advantage is based on tastes or preferences are not 
observable in economic surveys, but some observable characteristics which would 
correlate with a comparative advantage in the labor market do exist. For couples in which 
one member is more highly educated, for example, or for interracial couples, wherein the 
white member is less likely to face labor market discrimination (Badgett 2001, p. 265, n. 
6), the more highly educated partner or the white partner can have a comparative 
advantage relative to their partner in paid work. Therefore, the comparative advantage 
model can be useful in explaining the work decisions of same-sex couples, and not just 
those with children.  
While Becker’s model is certainly useful, there are other explanations of a 
household division of labor into paid and unpaid work which consider factors beyond 
comparative advantages in how couples assign roles in the household. Three prevalent 
alternative theories of specialization in paid or unpaid work use models which consider 
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bargaining power, institutional constraints, and gender roles as important social 
conditions that couples and households face, which can motivate a household division of 
labor (cf. Braunstein & Folbre 2001; Badgett 2001: Giddings 2003; Iversen & 
Rosenbluth 2006). These models were initially developed to provide insight into the labor 
decisions of different-sex couples, but we can also apply them to same-sex couples. 
Understanding a couple’s division of labor in terms of bargaining power, institutional 
constraints, and gender roles allows us to supplement the comparative advantage model 
with insights that consider how imbalances of power affect couples’ lives and decision 
making (Agarwal 1997; Giddings 1998; Bittman et al. 2003; Kroska 2004); they allow us 
to move our understanding of a couple’s division of labor away from one which depends 
mainly on efficiency maximization to one which includes the ways in which social 
structures affect household decision making. 
Bargaining power refers to one person’s ability to impose their own desires onto 
their partner, typically because they have a higher fallback position outside of the 
relationship. Comparisons of household members’ fallback positions are usually made in 
terms of wages, non-wage income, wealth, or other related characteristics (such as age 
and education, which are correlated with the former set of outcomes) (Oreffice 2007; 
Bobonis 2009). Applied to the question of the division of labor in a different-sex couple, 
we could imagine an example in which a married woman’s income increases, reducing 
the husband’s share of the total household income and subsequently, his bargaining 
power. The decrease in the woman’s dependence on her husband's wages allows her to 
have more of a say in the decision of how to allocate their labor time; she would now 
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have more leverage in saying that she wants to concentrate on her paid work and have 
less responsibility for household work (Ross 1987; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2006).  
The concept is the same for same-sex couples: we might expect the couple 
member with more income or higher education (because of stronger career prospects) to 
use their relative bargaining power over their partner and take less responsibility for the 
unpaid and socially undervalued household labor. To the extent that bargaining power 
depends on differences in personal characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and educational 
attainment – which can be the case because some groups have more resources than others 
– we might expect to see bargaining power play an important role in determining the 
division of labor in same-sex couples, since same-sex couples are somewhat more likely 
than different-sex couples to have a partner with different labor and non-labor traits such 
as race, age, level of education, investment income, and hourly earnings (Badgett 2001; 
Jepsen & Jepsen 2002; Jepsen & Jepsen 2006; Oreffice 2011; Oreffice 2012).  
A second alternative theorization of the household division of labor names the 
institutional constraints facing a couple as factors which can influence a couple’s decision 
of how to distribute their working responsibilities. Institutional constraints are broad 
social norms or rules that influence individuals’ decisions. Women’s lower wages 
compared to men, for example, are a part of institutionalized male dominance and play an 
important role in women’s relegation to household work. Racism is another 
institutionalized structure that constrains people’s choices; in an interracial couple, the 
person of color may find it harder to find paid employment or be paid less money, 
potentially resulting in them doing more household work in order to increase their 
contribution to the household.  
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Constraints such as the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage or 
institutionalized homophobia and discrimination against LGBT people may be important 
factors in the division of labor decision in same-sex couples. As explained by Becker 
(1991), Badgett (1995), Carrington (1999) and Giddings (2003), the lack of legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage in most states means that there is no lawful recourse to 
a person in a dissolved same-sex partnership who had left the labor market to do 
household and care work; in contrast, when heterosexual couples divorce, the person who 
had exited or reduced time in the labor market in order to do more of the household and 
care work has the legal right to alimony (even though states might not adequately enforce 
alimony rights or provide reasonable compensation). In this sense, we might expect 
married same-sex couples to exhibit a greater division of labor than unmarried same-sex 
couples, although the fact that same-sex marriage is rather recent and uncharted territory 
for the courts may make married same-sex couples hesitant to take the economic risk of 
specializing. Further, a lack of support from estranged parents and family members could 
encourage LGBT people to stay in the labor market and secure their own means of 
income, being more averse to losing their job. Discrimination in the labor market might 
mean that people in same-sex couples would need to work for pay as much as possible. 
On the other hand, Carrington (1999, p. 197) suggests that the lack of mobility for 
“lesbigay” people in the labor market might encourage them to do more domestic work, 
because they have more time to do so and because of the “disenchantment with notions of 
meritocracy and undivided commitment to work.”  
Another important institutional constraint that influences the average household 
division of labor into paid and unpaid work in the population of same-sex couples as a 
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whole is the potential legal difficulty for a same-sex couple to adopt a child. While only 
two states explicitly prohibit adoption by same-sex couples, only 16 states and 
Washington, D.C. explicitly allow joint adoption by same-sex couples, and just 10 states 
and Washington, D.C. allow for same-sex second parent adoption; in other states, the law 
differs by jurisdiction (Human Rights Campaign, 2013). Partly as a result, a smaller 
percentage of same-sex than different-sex couples has children (e.g. Black et al. 2007; 
Giddings et al. 2013). As discussed above, children are the most important factor in a 
couple’s decision to specialize (Becker 1991; Hersch & Stratton 1994; Dalmia & Sicilian 
2009); Black et al. (2007) and Giddings et al. (2013) show that in households where 
children are present, same-sex couples as well as different-sex couples are more likely to 
have one person staying at home full-time. Thus, although children seem to affect the 
specialization patterns of same-sex and different-sex couples similarly, the fact that fewer 
same-sex than different-sex couples have children means that the population of same-sex 
couples might be less likely to have a division of labor than the population of different-
sex couples, on average. However, within the couples themselves, we might expect 
similar levels of specialization. Indeed the division of labor into paid and unpaid work in 
couples with children may be in part a result of institutional constraints itself: parents 
prefer to do care work themselves, but face large penalties for doing part-time instead of 
full-time paid work. Therefore specialization is often the most reasonable choice.  
Finally, gender roles, which are social prescriptions of how biological men and 
women should behave, may also play an important role in couples’ division of labor 
decision. Gender roles are learned through social norms and policed heavily, even at a 
young age (Thorne 1993). Hartmann (1981a, p. 371) and England & Farkas (1986) argue 
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that different kinds of work have been “gendered” (prescribed normative gender roles); 
caring work, for example, has come to be seen as work for women because women’s 
gender roles prescribe that they should be caring and altruistic. Young men and women 
learn these roles and perpetuate them throughout their lives, encouraging their own (and 
other people’s) belief and expectation that women will do more household and caring 
labor while men do more paid work.  
If people in same-sex couples behave according to the gender assigned to their 
biological sex, we should expect a lesser degree of specialization in these households 
compared to different-sex couple households (Badgett 2001). It is possible, however, that 
people in some same-sex couples perform heteronormative gender roles, where one 
person in the couple plays the “feminine” role while the other plays the “masculine” role. 
Some of the leading scholars in the field caution against the notion, though: Badgett 
(1995, p. 131), citing Peplau (1991), says that “research in other social sciences reveals 
that same-sex couples typically reject gender roles,” and the survey data collected by 
Patterson (2000) and Blumstein & Schwartz (1983) show that lesbian couples tend to 
reject gender role norms. Despite these results, Weston (1991), Kennedy & Davis (1993), 
and Giddings (2003) theorize that many same-sex couples exhibit gender differences 
within the couple.  
The four theoretical explanations for household specialization presented above – 
comparative advantages, bargaining power, institutional constraints, and gender roles – 
can explain a household division of labor into paid and unpaid work in both different-sex 
and same-sex couples. Each theoretical framework offers a useful approach to explaining 
the existing empirical literature on the household division of labor in same-sex couples, 
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discussed below.   
 
Review of Existing Empirical Literature 
The theory reviewed above says that specialization in paid or unpaid work in 
same-sex couples should not be unexpected. What have the empirical studies of the work 
patterns of same-sex couples found thus far? Early sociological literature on the 
household division of labor in same-sex couples finds that that labor market work and 
household work are shared more equally in same-sex than in different-sex couples. 
Studies by Weston (1991), Blumstein & Schwartz (1983), Patterson (2000), Peplau & 
Spalding (2000), Solomon et al. (2005), and Kurdek (1993; 2007) find that many same-
sex couples report on surveys and in interviews that both members of the couple perform 
a fairly equal amount of household labor.  
However, the ethnographic work done by Carrington (1999) casts doubt over 
these subjectively reported results. Carrington finds that although his study participants 
reported valuing and doing an equal amount of household work on surveys and in 
interviews with both partners present, observation of the couples in everyday tasks and 
separate interviews with the members of the couples showed otherwise. Carrington 
interviewed 52 same-sex couples and lived with eight of them (four male and four 
female) for one week each, and noticed that even when the couple claimed to be dividing 
the household work evenly, their behavior showed otherwise. In actuality, these eight 
couples had rather strong divisions of labor into housework and labor market work. 
Carrington suggests that “lesbigay” couples may behave differently than they say they do 
with respect to a household division of labor, because constant scrutiny from the public 
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makes LGB people want to give an especially positive image of the gay and lesbian 
“lifestyle”. This pressure to present a positive public image leads them to misreport on 
how the work in their households is actually divided. Carrington likens his findings to 
Hochchild & Maschung’s (1989) concept of family myths – “myths intended to veil the 
actual unequal division of labor yet simultaneously affirm the basic equality of the 
relationship” (Carrington 1999, p. 10).  
Research on black lesbian step-families in New York City done by Moore (2008) 
also shows that these couples engage in a systematic division of labor into paid and 
unpaid work. Moore found, for example, that biological mothers took on more household 
chores and responsibilities than their partners. Several possible explanations from the 
theory outline above could explain the finding that the biological parent performed 
relatively more household and care work than her partner. The biological mother could be 
performing the motherly/feminine gender role, or we can view this result through the 
comparative advantage lens: the biological parent in Moore’s study is more likely to have 
spent time out of the labor market while she was pregnant and/or while her child was 
small, and therefore faces ceterus paribus lower wages than her partner.  
Further, Moore (2008) provides some empirical support for the existence of 
gender roles in same-sex couples: she divides her sample of 32 lesbians into “more 
feminine” and “less feminine” (using the respondents’ own self-identification with those 
terms – suggesting from the outset that same-sex couples do acknowledge their gender 
roles to at least some extent) and finds that the less feminine partner more often 
performed stereotypically male tasks such as taking out the garbage, doing yard work, 
and doing household repairs. Carrington (1999, p. 59), in discussing his interviews about 
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meal production with gay and lesbian couples, says that “[t]he gender strategies deployed 
by the different participants suggest an abiding concern about maintaining traditional 
gender categories, and particularly of avoiding the stigma that comes with either failing 
to engage in domestic work for lesbian families or through engaging in domestic work for 
gay-male families.” These studies are small and not representative, but offer some 
empirical evidence which suggests that at least some same-sex couples may take on 
heteronormative gender roles.  
Economists have started to use larger and more representative samples to 
contribute to the conversation about the division of labor in same-sex couples. Black et 
al. (2007) use descriptive statistics of data from the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses and find 
that one-third of different-sex couples have a partner who does not work for pay, while 
that is true for only 19 percent of same-sex couples (Table 5, p. 63). Jepsen & Jepsen 
(2006) test for differences in specialization, defined as absolute differences or ratios in 
earnings and wages, in partnered couples compared to roommates. In terms of earnings, 
they find that members of both different-sex and same-sex couples are significantly 
different from each other. However, same-sex couples are indistinguishable from 
roommates in terms of the hours worked, while people in different-sex couples show a 
significant difference in the number of hours worked. 
The role of children in the specialization patterns in same-sex couples has 
received some attention by economists, driven by the finding that the presence of children 
in a household is the most important predictor of a different-sex couple’s division of 
labor into paid and unpaid work (Lundberg & Rose 1998; Lundberg & Rose 2000; Bonke 
et al. 2007). Three papers by economists using large-scale datasets empirically explore 
55 
 
the role of children in the likelihood that a same-sex couple would specialize in unpaid 
housework and paid labor market work (Jepsen 2007; Antecol & Steinberger 2013; 
Giddings et al. 2013).
14
 Other relevant economics literature addresses the role of children 
in same-sex couples’ labor supply (Tebaldi & Elmslie 2006; Black et al. 2007; Leppel 
2009) but without being more precise about addressing specialization as such within a 
couple. 
Jepsen (2007) performed the first empirical test of specialization in female same-
sex couples and the role that children play in specialization decisions. She finds that 
women in same-sex couples are more likely than women in different-sex couples (either 
unmarried or married) to have a partner who does less than 20 hours per week of labor 
market work (14% versus 8% and 9%, respectively), hinting that individual women in 
same-sex couples are more likely to specialize in paid work than women in different-sex 
couples. To test for evidence of specialization in lesbian couples more directly and to see 
the role of children in household specialization, Jepsen regresses wages on standard 
human capital and demographic characteristics (race, ethnicity, experience (a function of 
age), education, urban status, English proficiency, and disability) as well as the number 
of hours the woman’s partner spends in paid work, separately for women with and 
without children. She finds that including a variable for partner labor market hours 
increases the wage premium for lesbians, especially when she allows for the effect of 
partner hours for lesbians in particular (by interacting partner hours and a dummy 
variable for the partner being lesbian). The wage premium becomes stronger for lesbians 
                                                 
14
 Earlier papers by psychologists using small samples (a maximum of 33 lesbian couples) find that lesbian 
couples with children specialize in paid work or household work to a lesser degree than different-sex 
couples with children, but that the biological mothers in lesbian couples do more childcare than their 
partners (Patterson 1995; Chan et al. 1998; Patterson et al. 2004). 
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with children once partner hours are controlled for. This finding suggests that the hours 
of paid work done by a lesbian’s partner is negatively correlated with the first lesbian’s 
wages, because this negative relationship was suppressing the wage premium when it was 
not explicitly controlled for (Table 7, p. 725). We can interpret the finding as some 
indication of specialization: as one partner does more labor market work, the other earns 
less in total – perhaps because she herself is working less. Interestingly, Jepsen does not 
interpret her finding in that way: instead she reports that she finds no evidence of 
specialization. Perhaps part of the confusion in interpretation comes about because Jepsen 
only reports the coefficient on the lesbian dummy variable, and leaves the reader 
inferring from the bit presented in the paper what the rest of the coefficients (e.g. on 
partner hours) must be in terms of sign and magnitude. 
Also using 2000 Census data, Leppel (2009) finds that the presence of a child 
under five increases the log of the odds of being unemployed or out of the labor force for 
women in different-sex couples (married and unmarried). Women in different-sex 
couples are less likely to do paid work when they have a child in the household. Having a 
child under five decreases the log odds of unemployment and increases the log odds of 
being out of the labor force for men in different-sex couples, which is unexpected (pp. 
204-5, Table A1). For same-sex couples, the presence of a child under five in the 
household lowers the log odds of being unemployed for both men and women in same-
sex couples (a logical association in the sense that there may be a selection bias of high-
earning/employed same-sex couples into parenthood; see the first paper in this 
dissertation), and the presence of children in the household increases the log odds of men 
in same-sex couples being out of the labor force. Children do not appear to have a 
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significant impact on the odds of being out of the labor force versus being employed for 
women in same-sex couples, suggesting little or no division of labor in female same-sex 
couples, but perhaps some division of labor in male same-sex couples.
15
  
Using CPS data from 2001, Tebaldi & Elmslie (2006) find that the presence of 
children (any people under 18) in a household decreases the number of hours in paid 
work performed by men and women in same-sex couples. In other words, the presence of 
children shifts the labor of people in same-sex couples from paid into unpaid work.
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However, this finding does not say anything about how the child might affect the two 
partners’ labor supplies differently. Indeed the studies by Elmslie & Tebaldi (2006), 
Leppel (2009) and Jepsen (2007) all suffer from this drawback: splitting the sample of 
people in same-sex couples into two groups, by for example higher/lower earner or 
position on the household roster, would be more informative about how children would 
affect couple members’ labor supply and wages, because children may affect the labor 
supply and wages of the two people in a couple differently (see also the first paper in this 
dissertation). Antecol & Steinberger (2013) rectify this problem in their study of the 
relationship between children and labor supply. 
Antecol & Steinberger (2013) analyze the labor supply of lesbian versus straight 
women using 2000 Census data, concentrating on the role of children in explaining the 
                                                 
15
 Leppel’s (2009) study is problematic in the sense that she does not account for the fact that the sample of 
same-sex couples is contaminated by unmarried different-sex couples (see Black et al. 2007b). It is 
therefore not clear if the results of the analysis are valid. 
16
 The study conducted by Tebaldi & Elmslie (2006) is flawed because the authors identify LGB people as 
people in the same household who are “unrelated and unmarried same-sex partners cohabiting whose age is 
25 years or older” (p. 554). They work with a sample of 828 lesbian or gay couples, out of a total sample of 
42,457 individuals. However, in the 2001 March CPS there are only 49 gay male couples and 63 lesbian 
couples who identify themselves as “unmarried partners” – less than one-tenth of one percent of the whole 
sample, a count much closer to that found in other studies of the LGB population (Black et al. 2000; Gates 
and Ost 2004). Tebaldi and Elmslie consider any unmarried adults of the same sex living together as LGB 
couples, including those who might consider each other just friends or roommates, clearly not a true sample 
of LGB people or couples.  
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sexual orientation labor supply gap. As a whole, lesbians supply much more labor than 
straight women at both the extensive margin (the decision to participate in the labor 
market at all) and the intensive margin (the number of hours worked, conditional on 
supplying some positive number of hours of labor). Antecol & Steinberger divide their 
sample into primary (higher) earner lesbians and secondary (lower) earner lesbians, and 
find that not only do the primary partners provide more labor than the secondary partners 
(who still provide more labor than straight women), but further that motherhood has less 
of an effect on the labor supply of lesbians than straight women and less on the labor 
supply of primary lesbians than on secondary lesbians. Having children in the household 
accounts for a much larger portion of the mean labor supply gap between (straight) 
married women and secondary lesbian earners (56%) than between (straight) married 
women and primary lesbian earners (15%); straight women’s labor supply is more similar 
to one group of lesbians (the secondary earners) than another (the primary earners). A 
parallel story emerges when the sample of lesbians is split into the primary and secondary 
group using a definition of primary and secondary based on the household roster – the 
householder (or first person listed on the survey) is the primary partner, while her 
“unmarried partner” is the secondary partner. Motherhood has a very different effect on 
the labor supplies of primary versus secondary lesbians, wherein the secondary lesbians 
respond to children being present in the household in a manner much more similar to 
straight married women than the primary lesbians (whose labor market supply looks 
much more like married men’s). These findings suggest that lesbian couples engage in 
some degree of household specialization, because the presence of children in the 
household corresponds with one – and only one – partner reducing the time she spends in 
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paid work. The study done by Antecol & Steinberger (2013) therefore provides a strong 
hint that female same-sex couples engage in at least some degree of specialization. 
Giddings et al. (2013) analyze the role of children in the division of labor in 
same-sex couples using American Community Survey data pooled from 2005 to 2009 to 
test for differences in household specialization. The authors define a couple’s degree of 
specialization as (1) the probability of both members of a couple working or working 
full-time (a higher probability that both partners work signals less specialization) and (2) 
the absolute difference in the hours worked of the two people in the couple (a larger 
difference in the number of hours worked indicates greater specialization), across couples 
of different sexual orientation/gender compositions. The authors find that same-sex 
couples have a lower average difference in hours worked among couple members and are 
more likely to have both people doing paid work, but that these differences (what the 
authors call the “specialization gap”) is lower in households with younger couples and 
households with children present. Same-sex couples without children are less likely to 
have a household division of labor into paid and unpaid work than different-sex couples, 
but the presence of children makes same-sex couples just as likely as different-sex 
couples to specialize. Giddings et al. (2013) therefore show that children are important 
drivers of specialization in both same-sex couples and different-sex couples.   
The present study builds on the insights from the work and theory discussed 
above, which suggests that there could be a household division of labor in same-sex 
couples into paid versus unpaid work, and tests several hypotheses that would explain 
specialization in different work by the people in these couples. In particular, I test the role 
of comparative advantages and bargaining power, gender roles, and institutional 
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constraints in predicting the number of minutes spent in different types of work for 
people in same-sex and different-sex couples.  I hypothesize that in different-sex couples, 
a person’s gender will be the strongest predictor of time spent in paid work (done more 
by men), household work, care work, and supervisory care work (done more by women). 
In same-sex couples, I hypothesize that comparative advantages and bargaining power 
based on race, ethnicity, education, age, and income will be predictors of time spent in 
different types of work, where the person who is more highly educated, older, white (in 
an interracial couple), non-Hispanic (in an inter-ethnic couple), and who has higher 
income will do more paid work and less unpaid work. Further, I expect that gender roles, 
represented by the share of men in a person’s same occupation and industry, will play a 
significant role in determining the number of minutes spent in different types of work, 
where a more masculine gender role will be associated with less unpaid work and more 
time in paid work. Finally, I expect that people in same-sex couples who lived in a state 
which allowed marriage or a marriage-like arrangement for same-sex couples at the time 
of their interview would be more likely to specialize into paid or unpaid work, depending 
on the relative income of both partners. I expect that the higher earner in couples with 
access to marriage or a marriage-like institution would do more paid work and vice 
versa). The next section describes the data employed and methodological approaches 
used to test these hypotheses.    
 
Data and Methods 
All previous empirical studies of the division of labor in same-sex couples in economics 
have modeled specialization in paid work as some measure of a person’s hours worked 
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for pay relative to their partner’s hours in paid work. A drawback to that approach is that 
it does not include any information regarding the time people spend in household and 
care work; it must not automatically be the case that the person who works fewer hours 
for pay will necessarily spend more hours doing home production. An ideal dataset would 
therefore include information on the time each member of a couple spends in both labor 
market activities on the one hand and household and care work on the other.  
 The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) collects data which bring us closer to 
this ideal. Participants in the ATUS are asked to write a diary of activities in which they 
participated on the previous day, including the travel time associated with the activity. 
ATUS respondents are individuals from households who had previously participated in at 
least one month of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and have no remaining rotations 
in the CPS cycle. The data collected from the CPS are linked to the time use data from 
the ATUS. Therefore, researchers using the ATUS have access to not just time use data, 
but to the wealth of demographic and economic data about all members of the household 
from the CPS. This study uses ATUS data pooled from 2003-2011, accessed via the 
ATUS-X service of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Abraham et al. 
2011). 
There are several concerns regarding the use of ATUS data to study a household 
division of household into paid and unpaid work. Time use data are not perfect and there 
are some clearly documented biases in the data. One concern, for example, is that time 
use survey respondents consistently show different responses to questions about 
household work than respondents who complete stylized reports. Stylized reports ask 
respondents how much time they spent on a specific activity during a certain period of 
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time, while time use surveys report all activities in which respondents participated, in 
temporal order, during a particular day. In the US, stylized reports often yield higher 
average values for time spent in housework than the survey method (Press and Townsley 
1998; Bianchi et al. 2000; Juster et al. 2003). Press and Townsley (1998) find that several 
factors affect the gap between the stylized and survey reports, namely, gender attitudes, 
total housework done by all household members, income class, respondent education 
level, household income, family size, and respondent employment status. They conclude 
that the stylized report is sensitive to social expectations about who “should” do 
housework. In this case, we should feel more comfortable using a time use survey, but it 
remains unclear how accurate the reporting on these surveys is. 
In analyzing the accuracy of respondent reports of time spent on household work 
in recall data such as those collected by the ATUS, Robinson and Godbey (1997) show 
that there is a positive, somewhat strong (80 percent) correlation between a respondent’s 
recollection of their time spent in household work on the previous day with what the 
respondents recorded doing when they were randomly paged and asked to write down 
what they were doing in the moment that moment. Robinson & Godbey (1997) also find 
that the respondents’ spouse agreed with the respondents’ reports of their time spent in 
household work approximately 80 percent of the time. Michelson (2005, p. 38) says, 
“although no one finds that time-use data are flawless, the consensus is that they 
approximate reality more closely than alternatives.” Further, while Gershuny (2000, p. 
106) acknowledges that “individuals sometimes slant their accounts, as for example 
husbands exaggerating or wives minimizing accounts of male domestic work in surveys 
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concerned with the domestic division of labor,” he argues that it is not “in principle less 
acceptable than any other form of questionnaire data.” 
Even to the extent that it provides accurate (enough) data on time spent in 
household work, there is a large drawback to using ATUS data for the present study. 
While demographic and economic data from the CPS are available for each household 
member in the participating households, only one person from each CPS household is 
solicited for participation in the ATUS. This means that the ATUS contains time use data 
on only one CPS household member, instead of both members of a couple, as would be 
ideal. Nevertheless we can employ ATUS data to study which personal and couple 
characteristics are related to time spent in paid and unpaid work for persons in different 
couple types.  
While the ATUS and CPS do not directly solicit data on their respondents’ sexual 
orientation, it is possible to locate people who are in same-sex and different-sex couples 
by using the “relationship category” variable (variable name “relate” in the ATUS) and 
information on the gender of all household members. ATUS participants who identify a 
“spouse” or an “unmarried partner” of the same sex are considered to be in same-sex 
couples; married and unmarried different-sex couples are identified in the same manner, 
but with different-sex partners. 
There are therefore four different couple types identifiable in the survey: 
different-sex married; different-sex unmarried; same-sex male; and same-sex female. I 
investigate time spent in four different types of work by people in these different couple 
types. The four types of work are “paid work,” which includes all time spend doing work 
or work related activities (e.g. checking email at work; enrolling in training); “household 
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work,” which includes, for example, interior and exterior maintenance, food preparation, 
and cleaning; “care work,” which is time spent caring for children or adults who live in 
the household, and includes activities such as giving a bath or taking the person to a 
doctor; and “supervisory care work,” which is all time spent doing any activity during 
which there was a child under 13 in the respondent’s care. All calculations include the 
time spent traveling related to the work being done.  
 To analyze the role of comparative advantages, bargaining power, institutional 
constraints, and gender roles in the amount of time spent in household work, care work, 
supervisory care work, and paid work, I do means comparative testing and use an OLS 
regression to predict the number of minutes spent in the various tasks based on a range of 
proxies for the four explanations of a household division of labor into paid and unpaid 
work. A dummy variable for living in a state in which same-sex couples can legally 
marry or can enter a legal domestic partnership with rights similar to marriage at the time 
that the time-use interview was given captures the role of institutional constraints in 
household division of work decisions. The date in which same-sex couples were granted 
access to marriage or a marriage-like institution by state are given in appendix table A2. 
Since a division of labor is economically risky for the person who does less paid work 
than his or her partner, marriage and civil unions should serve as legal protection for the 
person doing more household and care work. People in same-sex couples may be more 
willing and able to specialize if they are protected by marriage or legal partnership. I 
therefore interact living in a state with access to marriage or a marriage-like institution 
with being the lower earner in a couple, to see if the access to the legal protections of 
marriage make the lower earner more likely to spend more time in household work. 
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 There are no data in the ATUS or CPS about a respondent’s gender role 
identification. I make a proxy for one’s gender role identity by taking the percentage of 
people working in the same occupation and industry who are men; perhaps people 
working mainly with men or in a “man’s job” are more likely to play the stereotypical 
role at home of doing less housework and care work. Some particularly male-dominated 
fields with at least 50 employees are installation, maintenance and repair in the 
construction industry (98.4% men) and in the repair industry (97.7% men); some female-
dominated jobs are cleaning and maintenance in private households (95.0% women) and 
education, training and library jobs in the social assistance industry (96.0% women).   
 A comparative advantage in household work, care work, and supervisory care 
work is captured by having a lower market wage than one’s partner. Biological 
parenthood would be an ideal variable to study Becker’s comparative advantage 
hypothesis, but there is not information about biological parenthood in the ATUS or CPS 
data. I therefore use a dummy variable indicating that the respondent has an “own” child 
und 13 in the household, where this child could be a biological, adopted, or step-child, as 
well as an interaction term between being the lower earner in a couple and having a child 
present as an indication of a comparative advantage in household and care work.  
 The rest of the variables serve as some indicator of bargaining power within a 
couple. As Oreffice (2011) showed, the younger person in same-sex couples may have 
more bargaining power than their partner; I therefore include a dummy variable for being 
the older person in a couple. Because the age difference between the two people in same-
sex partnerships are usually larger than in different-sex couples, I control for the effect of 
the absolute age difference in the couple. A person’s absolute age is also included in the 
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model, since bargaining power may change with age, even holding couple-level 
characteristics constant. For example, a person may become more confident or secure 
with age, meaning that their ability to bargain would increase with age.  
Bargaining power might also be related to a person’s educational attainment 
relative to their partner’s; I include a dummy variable for being the less-educated partner. 
Finally, the person of color in an interracial or interethnic (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) 
couple with a white or non-Hispanic partner may have less bargaining power in the 
household because of the discrimination they face in the labor market. Their household 
bargaining power may be even further negatively affected if they are the lower earner in 
the couple. I therefore include dummy variables for being the person of color in an 
interracial or interethnic couple and well as interaction terms of being the person of color 
and having lower earnings than the partner.  
The sample sizes (and mean values for the dependent and independent variables 
of interest) are in table 1. After dropping households with a data quality flag (a total 866 
from the 124,517 time use respondents), the sample of 141 men and 177 women in same-
sex couples was further reduced to 111 and 132, respectively, because some information 
for some respondents was missing. The sample of men (women) in different-sex married 
couples fell from 29,889 (33,190) to 23,196 (20,286) after eliminating observations with 
missing data; the counts are 1,643 (1,818) men (women) to 1,176 (1,207) in different-sex 
unmarried couples.    
The means in table 2.1 allow us to get an initial sense of the amount of time spent 
in different types of work in the four couple types. On average, the women in different-
sex couples in this sample spend fewer minutes in paid work (300 minutes for married 
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straight women; 326 minutes for unmarried straight women) and more minutes in 
household and care work, not including supervisory care time (a combined 153 minutes 
for married straight women and 146 minutes for unmarried straight women) than the men 
in different-sex couples (almost 390 minutes of paid work and less than 70 minutes for 
care work and household work for both married and unmarried straight men). Women in 
different-sex couples spend between 70 (unmarried) and 100 (married) more minutes per 
day in supervisory care time than men in these couples.  
From the amount of time spent in paid work, it appears that men in same-sex 
couples may have a rather equal distribution of labor in their couple, since the mean 
number of minutes spent in paid work (343) falls between the mean for men and women 
in different-sex couples (388 and 313, respectively). Women in same-sex couples, 
however, spend a very high number of minutes in paid work on average (391), suggesting 
that both partners in same-sex female couples are responsible for doing paid work.  Men 
and women in same-sex couples also appear to be equally responsible for household 
work, on average, as their minutes spent in household work (29 for men; 26 for women) 
fall between the average of the men and in different-sex couples (13 for men and 47 for 
women).  
Although it is mostly children who are the recipients of others’ care work time, 
household members can also care for adults. Appendix table A3 shows, however, that 
time spent caring for household adults is rather minimal compared to the number of 
minutes spent doing caring labor for children. Therefore, the rest of the analysis in this 
paper concentrates on time spent in caring for children; care work is defined as the 
minutes spent doing care work for household children. 
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In households with children, men in same-sex couples spend a bit more time 
doing care work than men in different-sex couples with children (81 versus 70 minutes), 
but still not as much as women in any couple type spend on care work. Since the women 
in different-sex couples do more care work than the men, it is unclear where the extra 
care work time in same-sex male couples is being made up. In same-sex male couples, 
there are two men performing 81 minutes of care of (sum=162), while in different-sex 
married couples, the sum of the average care work time is 70+121=191.  Perhaps male 
couples make up for the “missing” care time by outsourcing the care work for their 
children (to daycares or babysitters) more often.  
Women in same-sex couples also spend more time in care work than their same-
gender counterparts in different sex couples (149 versus 119), which means that there is, 
on average, an abundance of care work done in same-sex female couples (149+149=298 
total minutes of care work per day, compared to the 162 minutes in different-sex 
couples). This may be the case because both women feel compelled to do the care work, 
since they have been socialized (as women) to do that labor.  
However, both men and women in same-sex couples spend less time than their 
same-gender counterparts in different-sex couples in supervisory care work. This finding 
suggests that people in same-sex couples may spend more time in activities with their 
children, instead of activities in which the child is merely present. The sum of the total 
time spent in care work, both as a main activity and in supervisory care time, shows that 
men in same-sex couples spend about the same amount of time in care as men in 
different-sex couples (339 for straight married: 332 for straight unmarried; 328 for gay) 
while women in same-sex couples spend much more time than women in different-sex 
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couples on care work (490 for straight married: 453 for straight unmarried; 469 for 
lesbian).  
 The other means in table 2.1 are consistent with the literature on the economics 
and demographics of same-sex couples. People in same-sex couples are on average more 
educated than people in different-sex couples (14.9 years for men in same-sex couples 
versus 13.9 (13.1) for men in different-sex married (unmarried) couples; 15.3 years for 
women in same-sex couples versus 14.2 (13.6) for women in different-sex married 
(unmarried) couples). People in same-sex couples are younger than married different-sex 
couples but older than unmarried different-sex couples: men in same-sex couples are 40.7 
compared to different-sex married (unmarried) men who are 45.2 (35.9) years old; 
women in same-sex couples are 41.4 compared to different-sex married (unmarried) 
women who are 44.1 (34.2) years old. Same-sex couples, particularly female couples, are 
more likely to live in a state which recognizes same-sex marriage or has other marriage-
like institutions available to same-sex couples. Same-sex couples are less likely than 
different-sex couples to have children under 13 in the household (about 16 percent of 
same-sex female compared to about 37 (26) percent of different-sex married (unmarried) 
couples), and a particularly low percent (6) of same-sex male couples have children in the 
household. On average, people in same-sex couples are less likely to work in occupations 
and industries dominated by either men or women, although women in same-sex couples 
work in more male-dominated jobs than women in different-sex couples do, and men in 
same-sex couples work in more female-dominated jobs than men in different-sex couples 
do. Same-sex couples are more likely than different-sex married couples to be interracial 
or interethnic; male same-sex couples are particularly racially and ethnically diverse. 
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Thirteen percent of male same-sex couples are interracial and/or interethnic, compared to 
about 4 percent of different-sex married couples, 6-7 percent of female same-sex couples, 
and 8-10 percent of different-sex unmarried couples. The earnings of the people in same-
sex couples in this sample are unusually high; the women in same-sex couples earn more 
than even men in different-sex couples ($873 versus $789 per week), a pattern which has 
not been reported in any study employing larger datasets. Finally, the Hispanic partner in 
same-sex interethnic couples is usually the lower earner in their couple (in 83.5% of 
interethnic male couples, the Hispanic person is the lower earner; the Hispanic person is 
the lower earner in 57.2% of interethnic female same-sex couples).   
 The means in table 2.1 do not divide the sample of people in same-sex couples in 
any way. In order to get a sense of which observable characteristics may be associated 
with specialization decisions in same-sex couples, I now turn to tests of time spent in 
different tasks for split samples of couples. In table 2.2, I report the mean number of 
minutes spent in paid work, household work, care work, and supervisory care work (the 
latter two categories for households with at least one child in them) for people in the four 
couple types. I divide the samples of couples in four ways: the higher/lower earner; the 
older/younger person; the more/less educated partner; and the person of color/white in 
interracial couples. While we are cannot observe the time spent in different work by two 
people in any one couple, table 2 reports the mean minutes spent in tasks for all people of 
a certain category (e.g. younger; higher earner) in the same couple type. Note that the 
means reported are only reported for people in couples where there is a difference in the 
characteristic in question within the couple; couples where both people have the same 
educational attainment, for example, are excluded from panel 3, which divides couples by 
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educational attainment. 
 The results in table 2.2 show that there appears to be at least some degree of 
specialization based on income, education, age, and racial differences in same-sex 
couples as well as different-sex couples. In all couple types, higher earners do more paid 
work and less care and household work, consistent with the comparative advantage and 
bargaining power models. Similarly, in same-sex and different-sex couples alike, more 
highly educated partners do more paid work and less household work, although those 
differences are not statistically significant in any couple other than different-sex married 
couples.  
While educational attainment differences seem to make no difference in the 
amount of care work (both direct and supervisory) done by people in different-sex 
couples, it is less educated partners in male same-sex couples and more highly educated 
partners in female same-sex couples who does more direct care work. The more highly 
educated partners in same-sex male couples do significantly more supervisory care work 
than the lower educated male partners.  
In all couple types, the younger partners do more care work (both direct and 
supervisory), but in same-sex male couples, the younger partners do less supervisory care 
work. There is no clear pattern between age and household work or paid work. Finally, 
the white partners in interracial same-sex couples do more paid work, the difference is 
very large in the case of same-sex female couples. However, the very small number of 
interracial same-sex couples in these data (only 12 men and 10 women in same-sex 
couples are in interracial couples) make any comparisons statistically weak. Further, only 
one man and one woman in an interracial same-sex couple has a child under 13 in the 
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household; it is therefore impossible to make any comparisons of time spent in care work 
for interracial same-sex couples.    
The univariate means in tables 2 hint that there is at least some degree of 
specialization in paid or unpaid work in same-sex couples; there are significantly 
different means for time spent in the various types of work for people with different 
characteristics in same-sex couples. However, these means – based on differences in only 
one variable – may be correlated with differences in other variables which are not held 
constant across the two groups being compared. In order to measure the relationship 
between the dependent variable (minutes spent in particular work) and any one 
independent variable (e.g. being the lower earner in a couple), I model 
            
            (2.1) 
where   is the number of minutes spent in the three different tasks   for person   of 
couple type   and   
  is the vector of control variables. This multivariate model allows us 
to see the relationship between the dependent variable and any independent variable, 
keeping all other independent variables constant. It allows us to get a sense of which of 
the independent variables play a role in determining the distribution of labor in the three 
couple types. Results are discussed in the next section. 
 
Multivariate OLS Results 
The results of the OLS regressions in equation (2.1) are presented in tables 2.3-
2.6. There are models in the appendix for different-sex couples only, in which a dummy 
variable for being female is included. As shown in appendix table B1, gender is the main 
predictor of time spent in various tasks in different-sex couples. Since this analysis is 
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obviously not possible for same-sex couples, I interpret the findings of the model without 
a gender dummy variable in the text. 
Even a quick glance at tables 2.3-2.6 shows that there is not much statistical 
significance in the results predicting time spent on various tasks in same-sex couples. 
This fact is of course due to the small sample size of same-sex couples and relatively 
large variance in answers. Nevertheless, we can see some general trends from the models, 
and I interpret the coefficients as meaningful averages for the populations; even when 
these point estimates are not statistically significant, we can still understand them to be 
economically and socially significant. 
Table 2.3 shows the model predicting the number of minutes spent in paid work.  
By the constant terms for the different populations, we can see that on average, men 
spend more time in paid work than women do; this is also true for men and women in 
same-sex couples.  
 For both men and women in different-sex couples, working in an occupation and 
industry with a larger share of men – our proxy for playing a masculine gender role – is 
correlated with spending more time in paid work. This finding is especially true for 
women. In same-sex couples, the gender composition of one’s occupation and industry 
has basically no effect on time in paid work. Higher weekly earnings are generally 
positively correlated with time spent in paid work; the more one earns, the more one 
works, and vice versa. 
 The findings of the bargaining power variables are mostly in line with the theory 
discussed above. Although this finding must be interpreted with caution because of the 
very small sample size, the person of color in an interracial same-sex female couple does 
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less paid labor than her partner, and males of color in same-sex couples do less paid work 
that their partners when they are also the lower earner. To the extent that time away from 
the labor market translates into time spent in household work, this result is in line with 
our theory that the lower-earner and/or person of color would have less bargaining power 
in the household and therefore do more housework and less paid work. The work patterns 
of interracial and interethnic different-sex couples do not tell as consistent a story as in 
the same-sex couples, leaving the possibility that a division of labor in different-sex 
couples is not based on race or ethnicity (and their interaction with earnings) because 
gender plays a more important role there, but in same-sex couples, race, ethnicity, and 
earnings serve as important differentiating characteristics upon which couples might 
construct a division of labor. The other bargaining power variable, relative (to one’s 
partner) age, is not in line with the theory above, or the findings in Oreffice (2011). In 
this model, the older partner in unmarried couples does less paid work.  
 The variable used to capture the institutional constraints of marriage gives the 
expected sign for men in same-sex couples. The lower earner in same-sex couples who 
lived in states with same-sex marriage or a marriage-like institution at the time of the 
ATUS interview spent less time in paid work than other people in same-sex couples. This 
finding suggests that these people may be taking advantage of the legal protections of 
marriage/civil partnership available to them, and are specializing in unpaid work. These 
data are of course only one-day observations, which means that we may not be able to 
reasonably interpret these results as an indication that couples specialize every day. 
However, if we assume that the data are representative of the respondents’ typical days, 
we can interpret these results as indications (or rejections) or specialization. 
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 Table 2.4 shows the results of the OLS model predicting the number of minutes 
spent in household work for the respondents in the various couple types. These results 
generally support the findings of the model predicting time spent in paid work, but with 
opposite signs (as more time in paid work is associated with less time in household 
work). The variable used to capture the effects of institutional constraints on the division 
of labor in same-sex couples, namely the limited access to marriage, shows that the lower 
earner in a same-sex couple does more household work when the couple lives in a state 
which gives legal recognition to same-sex partnership, especially in same-sex male 
couples. Again, these couples may be taking advantage of the legal protection of these 
institutions to benefit from a division of labor. However, the presence of children does 
not seem to enhance this finding; when children are in the household, the respondents in 
same-sex male couples do spend more time in household work, and the relative earnings 
of the couple members does not predict which partner takes on more household work 
when there is a child present, as our theory predicted. In different-sex married 
households, the opposite is true: there, the lower earner does slightly more household 
work when there is a child present – especially when the lower earner is a woman – 
which is in line with Becker’s comparative advantage theory. 
 The variable used to look at one’s gender identity shows the expected results for 
people in every couple type except same-sex female couples: working in a more male-
dominated industry and occupation is correlated with doing less household work. For 
women in same-sex couples, working in a more male-dominated job is weakly correlated 
with more household work and more paid work (table 2.3). This finding suggests that 
women in same-sex couples who may take on a masculine gender role at work are still 
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committed to equality in the amount of time spent on household work. For people in the 
other couple types, the findings in table 2.4 show that working in a more masculine job 
has a small but negative relationship with time spent in household work, potentially 
because of the gender roles socialized at work which are then brought into the household, 
or possibly because the work is more exhausting or has more overtime requirements. 
  The bargaining power variables show the same trends that were observed in table 
3. Simply being the lower earner does not correspond with doing more household work in 
and of itself, but in same-sex couples, when the lower earner is a person of color in an 
interracial or interethnic couple, that person takes on more of the housework. Again, it is 
not the case in different-sex couples that the intersection between earnings and race and 
ethnic differences plays an important role in determining the work patterns of the couple; 
this may be because different-sex couples divide their work based on biological sex 
differences while same-sex couples do so based on earnings and race and ethnicity. The 
bargaining power available to whites in same-sex interracial or interethnic couples 
appears to be stronger. Further, the less educated person in same-sex male couples does 
more household work, suggesting the bargaining power based on educational attainment 
does indeed work in the directions predicted in the theory for some same-sex couples.  
 To get a better sense of the role of children and comparative advantages in the 
division of labor in same-sex couples, we use the model in equation (2.1) above to predict 
the number of minutes spent in care work in households with at least one child present. 
The results are in table 2.5 and largely confirm the results in the other two models.   
 The first check of the relevance of institutional constraints on the amount of time 
spent in care work for same-sex couples with children shows that there is a positive 
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relationship between the time spent in care work and being the lower earner in a same-
sex couple in a state which allows marriage or civil unions. This finding, consistent in all 
three models, suggests that marriage or marriage-like rights may be quite important for 
the work decisions of same sex couples and can encourage, through legal protection, a 
household division of labor into paid and unpaid work. 
 A proxy for gender role performance shows that for women in same-sex couples, 
working in an occupation and industry with a higher share of men is associated with 
spending less time in care work, which is the result our theory predicted.  
 The test of the role of comparative advantage in terms of earnings shows that 
relative earnings in a couple do not predict the amount of time spent in household work in 
same-sex couples. Indeed in same-sex couples, having lower earnings is associated with 
doing less care work – the opposite of Becker’s prediction of how care work would be 
distributed. 
 The other variables indicating bargaining power within a couple show that the 
older person in same-sex male couples does more care work than their partners. The older 
partner in same-sex couples is more likely to do both paid work and less likely to do 
household and caring work. To the extent that unpaid work might be less interesting or 
desirable than labor market work, it appears that the older partner has more bargaining 
power in same-sex male couples.  Finally, in all couple types except for same-sex female 
couples, the less educated partner does more of the care work, which again shows that the 
comparative advantage/bargaining power model is not a very strong predictor of work 
decisions in same-sex female couples, but that it may be a better model for predicting the 
specialization decisions of same-sex male couples. 
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 Finally, table 2.6 presents the results of the model predicting the time spent in 
supervisory care work for people in the different couple types with at least one child at 
home. Some key findings of the other models are confirmed here: being the lower earner 
in a couple who had access to marriage or a marriage-like institution at the time of the 
ATUS interview is strongly correlated with more time in supervisory care work, 
especially in same-sex male couples. In contrast, the lower earner in a same-sex couple 
who did not have access to marriage or a marriage-like institution is likely to spend less 
time in supervisory care work that their higher-earning partner. The older partner in 
same-sex couples is likely to spend more time in supervisory care work as in direct care 
work. The person of color in same-sex female interracial or interethnic couples is more 
likely to spend time in supervisory care work than her partner. Finally, the lower 
educated partner in male same-sex couples does more supervisory care work, while it is 
the more highly educated partner in female same-sex couples who spends more time on 
supervisory care work.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
     The analysis presented in this paper suggests two important findings. First, 
from the means of minutes spent in housework, paid work, care work, and supervisory 
care work for men in women in different couple types, it appears that same-sex couples 
may have one person specialize in paid work and the other in unpaid work. The findings 
suggest that same-sex couples assign specialized roles based on relative (to their partner) 
income, education, age, and race, but less so than in different-sex couples. 
 A second important finding is that the working decisions of same-sex couples 
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may be affected by their institutional surroundings. When same-sex couples live in a state 
which grants legal recognition for marriage or a marriage-like institution, the lower 
earner in both male and female same-sex couples spends more time in housework and 
childcare work. This finding suggests that same-sex couples take advantage of the legal 
protections of these institutions, and increase their efficiency by having partners 
specialize in various tasks. Household specialization is economically and socially risky, 
and marriage rights for same-sex couples would offer some protection from the risks. 
 Appendix table B1 shows that gender differences – especially biological sex 
differences but also in socially constructed gender roles, as modeled through the share of 
men in a person’s occupation and industry – are the strongest predictor of the time 
members of a different-sex couple will spend in various tasks. This study has started an 
investigation which suggests that the fact that same-sex couples are not composed of two 
people of different sexes does not mean that their decisions about work are random. The 
findings in this study show that earnings, race and ethnicity, and the institutional political 
setting of the availability of marriage rights, are relevant factors in a same-sex couple’s 
decision of how to distribute their work responsibilities.  
 One obvious shortcoming of this study is the very small number of observations 
for people in same-sex couples in the ATUS data. Since same-sex couples are not only 
interesting to study in and of themselves but also provide the possibility to study the 
construction of relations of inequality within couples, researchers should demand 
continued and expanded data collection on this population. Further research on the 
division of labor in same-sex couples would further benefit from the inclusion of 
qualitative data. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Couples in ATUS, 2003-2011 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Different-Sex 
Married 
Men
Different-Sex 
Married 
Women
Different-Sex 
Unmarried 
Men
Different-Sex 
Unmarried 
Women
Same-Sex 
Men
Same-Sex 
Women
Time Spent, in minutes…
   Paid Work Time 387.0 300.3 389.2 325.7** 343.1 391.4***
(2.362) (2.378) (10.068) (9.685) (31.604) (30.683)
   Household Work Time 12.2 53.2 14.5 41.3*** 28.6** 26.2***
(0.337) (0.757) (1.555) (2.675) (6.744) (5.489)
   Care Work Time 70.2 121.2 69.1 116.9 81.1 149.2
(1.134) (1.452) (6.198) (7.479) (51.336) (27.553)
   Supervisory Care Time 269.0 369.1 263.2 336.2** 247.3 319.6
(2.515) (2.890) (12.206) (17.266) (112.654) (53.045)
Means of…
   Respondents l iving in a 
State with Marriage Rights 20.9 20.2 21.6 24.7*** 27.0 34.4***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) (0.053) (0.057)
   Any Children under 13 in 
Household 43.4 37.2 24.4*** 26.8*** 6.0*** 15.9***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.015) (0.027) (0.034)
   Percent Men in Job 66.2 33.7 67.4 35.1* 48.7*** 42.8***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.025) (0.027)
   Weekly Earnings 788.8 600.0 616.2*** 554.9*** 876.2 872.6***
(5.119) (4.461) (15.852) (16.185) (79.468) (64.513)
   Lower Earner 22.6 48.7 26.8** 48.5 38.5**** 37.5**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.019) (0.055) (0.055)
   Absolute Age 45.2 44.1 34.9*** 34.2*** 40.7*** 41.4**
(0.105) (0.109) (0.432) (0.434) (1.259) (1.289)
   Older Partner 63.8 20.1 58.5*** 25.7*** 32.5*** 48.6***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.016) (0.052) (0.057)
   Age Difference 3.5 3.8 4.4*** 4.6*** 6.3*** 5.0**
(0.030) (0.037) (0.160) (0.184) (0.772) (0.666)
   Years of Education 13.9 14.2 13.0*** 13.6*** 14.9*** 15.3**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.089) (0.113) (0.372) (0.464)
   Interracial Couples 4.3 4.3 9.6*** 9.9*** 12.8* 5.6
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.044) (0.020)
   Lower Earner Not White in 
Interracial Couple 22.3 49.3 29.5 48.2 28.6 40.6
(0.022) (0.030) (0.056) (0.094) (0.189) (0.215)
   Interethnic 4.3 4.2 8.8** 8.1** 12.6** 6.8
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.022)
   Lower Earner Hispanic in 
Interethnic Couple 23.9 51.6 32.8 49.0 83.5*** 57.2
(0.026) (0.029) (0.077) (0.102) (0.133) (0.215)
   Interviewed on Holiday 1.7 1.6 1.3 0.8*** 0 2.2
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) --- (0.022)
   Interviewed on Weekend 28.4 28.7 28.2 26.2* 35.2 26.7
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.013) (0.050) (0.041)
Observations 23196 20286 1176 1207 111 132
Notes: A statistically significant difference in means between columns 3 and 5 versus 1, and 4 and 6 versus 2 
is indicated by * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), or *** (p<0.01).
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Table 2.2: Mean Number of Minutes Spent in Different Types of Work, Within Various 
Couple Types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher Earner Lower Earner Higher Earner Lower Earner Higher Earner Lower Earner Higher Earner Lower Earner
Paid Work Time 363.9 321.2*** 363.9 347.0 421.6 265.1** 424.3 333.0
(2.324) (2.800) (9.597) (11.500) (36.481) (55.084) (37.098) (54.459)
Care Work Time 79.7 109.9*** 81.7 108.7*** 20.7 170.8 200.0 123.8
(1.200) (1.610) (6.230) (8.902) (18.079) (94.849) (41.188) (35.967)
Household Work Time 25.3 39.8*** 22.5 33.8*** 10.7 58.3*** 14.3 35.8**
(0.510) (0.737) (1.714) (2.845) (5.545) (13.988) (5.375) (9.581)
Supervisory Care Work Time 287.8 345.4*** 290.6 313.6 201.5 360.1 283.7 333.9
(2.575) (3.276) (15.521) (15.046) (167.999) (62.661) (40.805) (80.222)
Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger
Paid Work Time 370.4 324.2*** 359.9 345.4 211.0 395.5*** 389.9 356.3
(2.582) (2.588) (11.072) (10.149) (49.589) (41.226) (42.443) (52.108)
Care Work Time 77.7 104.2*** 84.4 104.3* 48.8 350.0*** 128.5 191.4
(1.331) (1.468) (6.559) (8.663) (13.630) --- (33.384) (53.604)
Household Work Time 20.4 14.1*** 23.4 33.1*** 42.8 21.3 27.3 31.0
(0.517) (0.693) (2.046) (2.616) (15.391) (7.607) (8.578) (8.895)
Supervisory Care Work Time 286.8 336.2*** 292.8 293.0 553.9 465.0 432.8 290.4
(2.815) (3.116) (13.512) (11.887) (129.583) --- (81.288) (40.169)
Higher 
Education
Lower 
Education
Higher 
Education
Lower 
Education
Higher 
Education
Lower 
Education
Higher 
Education
Lower 
Education
Paid Work Time 357.2 344.6*** 350.1 343.6 361.1 291.1 459.7 424.0
(3.208) (3.579) (14.375) (15.703) (64.225) (57.311) (65.834) (49.392)
Care Work Time 97.5 93.6 109.2 110.3 36.3 194.1* 223.9 140.2
(1.659) (2.139) (9.754) (14.148) (24.716) (78.634) (74.167) (21.756)
Household Work Time 29.2 32.0** 29.7 31.1 17.1 49.5* 14.6 25.7
(0.707) (0.916) (3.375) (4.043) (6.555) (16.948) (4.779) (9.038)
Supervisory Care Work Time 315.3 304.5** 317.3 296.5 775.2 327.8*** 331.0 265.9
(3.723) (3.962) (35.247) (17.528) (44.137) (85.216) (93.471) (42.779)
in interracial couples.. White Person
Person of 
Color White Person
Person of 
Color White Person
Person of 
Color White Person
Person of 
Color
Paid Work Time 347.1 365.5 319.6 305.1 463.0 447.0 461.1 191.3***
(12.545) (11.204) (33.184) (27.840) (79.344) (127.802) (17.343) (96.625)
Care Work Time 109.0 90.0** 142.4 89.9* 70.0 --- --- 135.0
(6.282) (5.170) (24.126) (17.382) --- --- --- ---
Household Work Time 29.3 24.5 27.5 19.5 7.5 38.1 --- 38.4
(2.514) (1.918) (5.356) (5.961) (6.636) (35.572) --- (32.780)
Supervisory Care Work Time 328.3 290.8** 281.3 294.0 715.0 --- --- 675.0
(13.415) (11.665) (41.257) (32.439) --- --- --- ---
Notes: Author's calculation on ATUS 2003-2011 data. Standard errors in parenthases. *, **, *** denotes a statistically significant difference 
in the number of minutes spent on a task by people in the same couple type at p<.01, .05, .10, respectively. Number of minutes spent in care 
work only for households with at least one child present.
Different-Sex Married Different-Sex Unmarried Same-Sex Men Same-Sex Women
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Table 2.3: Predicting Minutes Spent in Paid Work 
 
 
 
Different-Sex 
Married 
Men
Different-Sex 
Married 
Women
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Men
Different-Sex 
Unmarried 
Women
Same-Sex 
Men
Same-Sex 
Women
State with Marriage Rights -12.047* -6.295 -19.600 -63.909** -5.528 99.551**
(6.223) (7.763) (27.040) (29.927) (55.922) (50.773)
Marriage Rights* Lower 
Earner 16.655 -14.692 4.655 86.004** -118.118 -141.335
(12.044) (10.795) (56.974) (39.651) (103.555) (119.081)
Percent Men in Job 11.860 48.182*** 13.010 62.934 -24.531 52.126
(8.858) (9.667) (37.570) (42.130) (133.039) (109.572)
Absolute Weekly Earnings 0.012*** 0.069*** 0.039** 0.055** 0.039 0.151***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.019) (0.024) (0.052) (0.041)
Lower Earner in Couple -16.100** 3.056 18.262 -0.764 22.402 38.376
(7.861) (6.018) (27.482) (24.486) (98.177) (78.120)
Absolute Age -0.201 -0.768*** -0.202 0.846 2.187 1.186
(0.261) (0.255) (0.879) (0.883) (2.556) (1.896)
Older Person in Couple 1.559 6.144 -16.639 -7.364 -135.896** -14.747
(4.463) (5.174) (18.121) (19.954) (61.570) (45.182)
Person of Color - 
Interracial 7.273 25.976 -36.408 -35.052 120.010 -210.152*
(16.458) (18.710) (38.619) (67.221) (120.171) (115.288)
Person of Color* Lower 
Earner -36.626 -12.964 -43.156 10.229 -278.583* 75.800
(34.939) (27.513) (67.982) (97.248) (166.102) (191.544)
Hispanic - Interethnic -16.693 1.022 -37.589 -64.739 -145.301** -41.005
(14.302) (19.478) (38.618) (76.339) (72.565) (133.245)
Hispanic Interracial* 
Lower Earner 39.073 -7.589 31.411 71.534 106.728 103.668
(31.964) (26.841) (58.670) (91.130) (139.621) (197.464)
Lower Education -2.139 -18.034*** -61.395*** 36.996* -22.008 94.230**
(5.032) (5.189) (22.524) (21.754) (59.508) (45.596)
Any Children Under 13 -3.434 -33.994*** -52.343** -17.183 17.677 -12.561
(5.262) (5.487) (21.097) (22.412) (99.426) (69.923)
Lower Income*Children 5.672 -4.951* 13.258 -12.605 -50.909 54.910
(3.985) (2.897) (13.947) (13.163) (61.706) (41.701)
Interview on Holiday -299.751*** -215.308*** -250.794*** -193.829** 0.000 -228.478**
(16.089) (14.986) (52.625) (77.519) (.) (102.897)
Interview on Weekend -365.940*** -303.120*** -302.750*** -272.181*** -268.302*** -289.730***
(3.803) (3.610) (17.540) (15.768) (62.027) (49.116)
Constant 499.494*** 387.315*** 491.703*** 331.063*** 392.262** 221.765**
(15.602) (13.912) (46.972) (40.136) (160.538) (99.663)
Observations 22032 19723 1158 1196 110 129
Notes: Author's calculation on ATUS 2003-2011 data. Standard errors in parenthases. *, **, *** denotes p<.01, 
.05, .10 respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Predicting Minutes Spent in Housework 
 
Different-
Sex 
Married 
Men
Different-
Sex 
Married 
Women
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Men
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Women
Same-Sex 
Men
Same-Sex 
Women
State with Marriage Rights 0.997 2.742 3.549 -5.254 -19.308 -3.630
(0.893) (3.027) (3.850) (7.029) (12.975) (8.235)
Marriage Rights* Lower 
Earner 1.599 -0.119 3.383 -7.760 60.413* 23.888
(1.819) (3.873) (9.977) (9.882) (31.449) (17.739)
Percent Men in Job -4.571*** -0.348 -2.117 -21.482* -13.550 34.061
(1.391) (3.418) (7.064) (11.174) (23.745) (29.981)
Absolute Weekly Earnings 0.000 -0.015*** -0.000 -0.002 0.007 -0.007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Lower Earner in Couple 0.559 5.315*** -1.939 -9.794 -9.458 -9.228
(1.130) (2.006) (5.086) (6.644) (16.632) (16.323)
Absolute Age -0.100** 0.503*** 0.160 1.212*** 0.207 -0.444
(0.046) (0.077) (0.149) (0.224) (0.406) (0.501)
Older Person in Couple 0.093 -1.161 2.828 -6.298 15.476 -0.398
(0.714) (1.981) (3.231) (5.210) (14.147) (9.760)
Person of Color - Interracial -0.746 -6.000 13.599 -13.531* 25.874 -23.008
(2.195) (5.474) (11.168) (7.294) (21.723) (16.978)
Person of Color* Lower 
Earner 2.100 -10.070 -16.348 -18.318* 55.899 89.286
(4.051) (6.745) (16.792) (9.675) (78.527) (65.808)
Hispanic - Interethnic 1.930 10.322 1.469 36.158** -58.980*** -3.295
(2.211) (7.903) (5.184) (15.135) (20.470) (12.404)
Hispanic Interracial* Lower 
Earner -4.578 -10.844 -18.204*** -4.371 131.603*** 8.438
(4.472) (10.386) (6.373) (32.484) (37.481) (37.349)
Lower Education 0.153 5.502*** 5.629 2.490 22.362 -7.254
(0.762) (1.998) (4.524) (7.343) (15.707) (12.835)
Any Children Under 13 0.997 4.970** -1.490 9.289* 42.338* -5.986
(0.944) (1.950) (2.827) (5.235) (24.232) (12.914)
Lower Income*Children 1.640*** 5.124*** 0.801 1.999 -5.320 0.598
(0.603) (1.114) (2.790) (3.154) (11.081) (16.639)
Interview on Holiday 3.881 5.970 8.030 -33.068*** 0.000 99.478
(2.716) (6.595) (12.462) (7.168) (.) (115.490)
Interview on Weekend 13.615*** 33.684*** 8.539** 32.045*** 41.319*** 29.868**
(0.752) (1.538) (3.500) (5.190) (14.017) (12.747)
Constant 14.012*** 22.353*** 5.397 4.818 -8.618 31.362
(2.758) (4.201) (7.168) (10.388) (22.959) (26.588)
Observations 23196 20286 1176 1207 111 132
Notes: Author's calculation on ATUS 2003-2011 data. Standard errors in parenthases. *, **, *** 
denotes p<.01, .05, .10 respectively. 
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Table 2.5: Predicting Minutes Spent in Care Work 
 
 
 
 
Different-
Sex 
Married 
Men
Different-
Sex 
Married 
Women
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Men
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Women
Same-Sex 
Men
Same-Sex 
Women
State with Marriage Rights 2.890 -1.261 20.591 77.974*** 167.200*** 8.942
(3.476) (4.980) (18.572) (29.837) (0.000) (59.947)
Marriage Rights* Lower 
Earner -1.107 7.208 12.817 -22.689 438.780*** 175.248
(6.699) (7.118) (36.725) (46.023) (0.000) (140.960)
Percent Men in Job -38.433*** -12.817* -2.987 -6.733 0.000 -224.195***
(4.424) (6.812) (22.792) (32.175) (.) (86.983)
Absolute Weekly Earnings 0.009*** 0.006* -0.022* -0.049** 0.209*** -0.034
(0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.020) (0.000) (0.036)
Lower Earner in Couple 16.087*** 2.872 0.816 1.413 -24.689*** -242.389***
(3.775) (3.447) (18.015) (12.836) (0.000) (76.979)
Absolute Age -0.886*** -2.370*** -0.929 -2.416** -17.869*** -8.468**
(0.185) (0.224) (0.705) (0.973) (0.000) (3.696)
Older Person in Couple -0.662 7.495** 14.571 6.311 51.165*** 22.094
(2.557) (3.481) (12.354) (14.025) (0.000) (51.682)
Person of Color - Interracial -1.436 -3.681 31.377 -29.978 0.000 20.738
(7.322) (13.541) (31.136) (59.749) (.) (47.714)
Person of Color* Lower 
Earner -9.623 11.705 -27.398 -15.369 0.000 0.000
(14.051) (17.481) (44.756) (67.972) (.) (.)
Hispanic - Interethnic -0.432 -22.597** -38.349** -10.048 0.000 -91.053
(7.075) (10.700) (18.475) (40.430) (.) (61.501)
Hispanic Interracial* Lower 
Earner 7.870 18.009 66.529* -10.229 0.000 0.000
(16.903) (15.573) (40.360) (52.109) (.) (.)
Lower Education 10.129*** 4.980 23.805 45.466* 564.077*** -32.621
(3.120) (3.415) (16.548) (26.236) (0.000) (79.378)
Interview on Holiday -6.400 -29.106*** 169.544** -11.886 0.000 0.000
(7.470) (9.828) (68.335) (39.748) (.) (.)
Interview on Weekend 7.702*** -27.775*** 7.307 -14.504 72.230*** -8.123
(2.084) (2.579) (13.598) (14.705) (0.000) (37.042)
Constant 114.436*** 212.287*** 87.876*** 196.703*** 327.159*** 708.541***
(7.961) (9.875) (27.645) (33.196) (0.000) (188.942)
Observations 12893 10293 381 433 9 32
Notes: Author's calculation on ATUS 2003-2011 data. Standard errors in parenthases. *, **, *** denotes 
p<.01, .05, .10 respectively. 
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Table 2.6: Predicting Minutes Spent in Supervisory Care Work 
 
 
 
Different-
Sex 
Married 
Men
Different-
Sex 
Married 
Women
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Men
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Women
Same-Sex 
Men
Same-Sex 
Women
State with Marriage Rights -14.944** 8.336 110.041*** 3.677 405.839*** -139.265**
(6.513) (9.215) (36.218) (49.870) (0.000) (60.345)
Marriage Rights* Lower 
Earner -1.295 -18.279 -62.514 -17.887 911.102*** 412.742***
(13.263) (12.786) (106.588) (61.297) (0.000) (100.068)
Percent Men in Job -18.765** -49.235*** 39.574 -21.972 0.000 363.086***
(9.248) (12.831) (44.106) (91.829) (.) (132.636)
Absolute Weekly Earnings -0.001 -0.060*** -0.039 -0.111*** -0.051*** -0.146***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.030) (0.038) (0.000) (0.042)
Lower Earner in Couple -0.547 8.919 -24.518 -7.497 -79.914*** -167.042**
(6.702) (6.265) (31.628) (41.604) (0.000) (72.940)
Absolute Age 0.059 0.174 -0.974 0.729 -35.274*** 7.085
(0.341) (0.435) (1.614) (1.802) (0.000) (5.144)
Older Person in Couple 3.826 -12.620** 42.847* -37.039 441.008*** 151.954**
(4.878) (6.311) (23.753) (30.870) (0.000) (76.046)
Person of Color - Interracial -4.583 -34.129 17.440 -178.167** 0.000 380.841***
(14.771) (25.198) (40.866) (69.983) (.) (67.049)
Person of Color* Lower 
Earner 25.306 4.707 46.300 215.120** 0.000 0.000
(32.566) (31.602) (79.676) (96.500) (.) (.)
Hispanic - Interethnic 15.168 39.988 12.726 6.369 0.000 233.537***
(15.781) (26.797) (40.625) (80.100) (.) (72.752)
Hispanic Interracial* Lower 
Earner -49.149* -4.726 -88.073 -103.857 0.000 0.000
(27.383) (34.705) (70.668) (102.239) (.) (.)
Lower Education 0.726 4.125 26.783 -24.747 945.384*** -219.736***
(5.373) (6.522) (23.937) (31.403) (0.000) (56.033)
Interview on Holiday 275.030*** 217.770*** 150.755*** 248.453** 0.000 0.000
(22.791) (21.098) (57.562) (118.484) (.) (.)
Interview on Weekend 265.626*** 233.596*** 162.667*** 191.711*** 894.622*** 285.182***
(4.784) (5.032) (25.166) (30.147) (0.000) (51.383)
Constant 199.886*** 340.905*** 188.504*** 338.013*** 741.655*** -28.015
(15.245) (17.342) (56.620) (100.828) (0.000) (209.789)
Observations 12893 10293 381 433 9 32
Notes: Author's calculation on ATUS 2003-2011 data. Standard errors in parenthases. *, **, *** 
denotes p<.01, .05, .10 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POVERTY IN LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Introduction 
For good reason, poverty receives a great deal of attention in the economics literature. 
Poverty rates across groups are often compared as an indication of the relative well-being 
of various groups. Despite the tremendous surge in research on the economic lives of 
lesbians and gay men since Badgett’s (1995) groundbreaking study on the wages of 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people, very little research on poverty in LGB versus 
straight couples exists, despite good reason to believe that LGB and straight households 
are at different risks of poverty. 
 Same-sex couple households may have different poverty rates or chances of being 
in poverty than different-sex couple households for two main reasons. First, same-sex 
couple households have different characteristics than different-sex couple households, 
and some of these characteristics are related to the probability of being in poverty. Higher 
levels of labor force participation, for example, serve as a barrier to poverty. Since both 
male and female same-sex couples have higher levels of labor force participation than 
different-sex couples (at both the extensive and intensive margins), LGB households may 
be safer from poverty than straight households. Greater racial and ethnic diversity in LGB 
couples (meaning that same-sex couples are more likely to be interracial), on the other 
hand, may make them more likely to be poor, since minority racial and ethnic groups 
have higher poverty rates. The differences in a couple’s characteristics, which differ by 
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the sexual orientation of the people in a couple, are therefore related to the couple’s 
chances of being in poverty.  
Secondly, LGB people and couples may be treated differently than straight people 
and couples. Discrimination against LGB people may put the LGB group at a higher risk 
of poverty. For example, employer discrimination against LGB people can result in lower 
wages for LGB people, even if they have the same qualifications as straight people. 
 This study investigates whether and why the poverty rates and probability of 
being in poverty are different by household type. It therefore provides previously 
unknown information about the economic situation of households headed by same-sex 
couples, and may therefore be helpful in informing public policy aimed at protecting 
groups in a more vulnerable economic position. 
 
The Determinants of Poverty 
The literature on poverty differentials across populations identifies several 
determinants or predictors of poverty: employment, education, race/ethnicity, household 
structure, age, disability, region and community, and the gender of the householder. 
These individual- and household-level characteristics differ by sexual orientation, and 
therefore provide first hints about how and why the chances of being in poverty might 
differ for same-sex versus different-sex couple households.   
The first critical determinant of poverty, employment status, is perhaps the most 
obvious predictor of a person or family’s chances of being in poverty, in that employment 
brings income, which is a direct opposing force to poverty. Although there are many 
“working poor” in America – people who have jobs but do not earn enough at those jobs 
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to escape poverty – employment generally serves as a bridge out of poverty (see e.g. 
Schiller 2004, chapter 5). In more same-sex couples than different-sex married couples, 
both members of the couple work in the paid labor force (Black et al. 2007; Antecol & 
Steinberger 2013; Giddings et al. 2013), which protects same-sex couples from poverty. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for households headed by different couple types in 
the 2010 American Community Survey data (described in detail below). Table 1 shows 
that 63.2 percent of same-sex male and 67.6 percent of female same-sex couples were 
composed of two employed people, compared to just 55.8 percent of unmarried and 48.8 
percent of married different-sex couples. These differences in employment status serve as 
a protection from poverty for LGB people and families.  
A second important determinant of poverty is one’s educational attainment. 
Higher levels of education open opportunities for employment and better paying jobs, 
and thus serve as protection against poverty. On average, people in same-sex couples 
have higher levels of educational attainment than those in different-sex couples (e.g. 
Black et al. 2007a). As table 1 shows, same-sex couples (both male and female) are more 
likely to have one or both partners with more than a high school degree: 43.9 (39.4) 
percent of female (male) same-sex couples are composed of two people whose formal 
education goes beyond a high school diploma, compared to just 30.1 (16.9) percent of 
married (unmarried) different-sex couples. The relatively high educational attainment of 
people in same-sex couples should protect them from poverty. 
Race and ethnicity are third predictors of poverty. African Americans and 
Hispanics are much more likely to be in poverty than whites and non-Hispanics, for 
example, in large part because of discrimination in education, the labor market, and the 
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housing market (Albelda et al. 1994; Schiller 2004; Quillian 2012). Same-sex couples are 
less likely than different-sex married couples to be composed of two white people 
(although the difference is not statistically significant for same-sex male couples versus 
different-sex married couples), and are more likely to have at least one Hispanic member 
of the couple. However, both male and female same-sex couples are more likely to be 
composed of two white and two non-Hispanic people than different-sex unmarried 
couples. The racial and ethnic composition of same-sex couples would serve as a 
protection from poverty vis-à-vis different-sex married couples, but would be associated 
with poverty rates higher than different-sex married couples.   
Family size and structure is a fourth predictor of poverty. Children increase the 
need for financial resources but also limit the ability for parents to work. Single-parent 
households are at the highest risk of poverty (Schiller 2004). Households with more 
working-age adults can serve as a barrier to poverty, as those adults can work and 
contribute to family resources. However, it is also not clear that household adults share 
resources equally; some may have more access to household resources than others, and 
some may have to contribute more than others (Folbre 1986; Woolley & Marshall 1994). 
Same-sex couples are less likely to have any children in the household than different-sex 
couples, and they have a lower number of children when they have any children at all. 
This difference can serve as a protection from poverty for same-sex couples. Same-sex 
couples are less likely to have additional adults in their household compared to married 
different-sex couples, but given the definition of poverty employed in this study 
(discussed in the next section), the number of adults should not serve as a direct predictor 
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or poverty for the households in this study (although it may be an indicator of adults’ 
financial need to share resources with other adults).  
A fifth determinant of poverty is age. Older people are at the highest risk of being 
in poverty; along with age comes decreased income as people enter retirement or face 
age-based discrimination (Rothenberg & Gardner 2011). Young adults, who may have 
taken jobs before completing their education or are in entry-level positions, are more 
likely to be in poverty than those 25 or older (Schiller 2004). Same-sex couples, and 
especially lesbian couples, are much more likely to have a householder under 25, but are 
less likely to have a householder 65 or older. Compared to different-sex unmarried 
couples, on the other hand, people in same-sex couples are less likely to be very young 
and more likely to be of retirement age. Thus the age distribution of same-sex couples 
compared to different-sex couples is sometimes relatively beneficial (less likely than 
unmarried different-sex couples to be very young and less likely than married different-
sex couples to be over 64), sometimes relatively dangerous (more likely than married 
different-sex couples to be very young and more likely than unmarried different-sex 
couples to be over 64).  
Other determinants of poverty will also be relevant when comparing the poverty 
rates of same-sex versus different-sex couple households. Regional and community 
characteristics such as access to public transport to commute to work and well-developed 
infrastructure can serve as a barrier to poverty (Haughton & Khandker 2009); therefore 
residing in a more urban area may be a barrier to poverty. Same-sex couples are more 
likely to live in urban areas than both married and unmarried different-sex couples. City 
or state level anti-discrimination policies can also serve as a barrier to poverty 
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specifically for LGB people. Fluency in the English language also protects from poverty, 
as it increases the educational and work opportunities available to a person. Same-sex 
couples are more likely to have both members of the couple fluent in English than 
different-sex couples. Disability, which can serve as a barrier to employment, can put a 
person or family at risk of poverty. Same-sex couples are less likely to have a disabled 
member than different-sex married couples, but more likely than different-sex unmarried 
couples.  
Finally, the gender of the householder is often cited as a strong determinant of 
poverty; households headed by women – especially single-parent households – are more 
likely to be poor than those headed by men (Schiller 2004; Haughton & Khandker 2009). 
In our case, the gender of the householder and the spouse/partner is obviously relevant. 
On average, women earn less than men, but women in same-sex couples earn more than 
their same-gender counterparts in different-sex married couples. Although lesbians earn 
more than straight women, they still earn less than both gay and straight men. Similarly, 
while gay men earn less than straight men, they still earn more than lesbians or straight 
women (see e.g. Table 1 in Antecol et al. 2008). Therefore, we might expect lesbian 
couples to have the lowest combined income and therefore highest poverty rates, 
followed by straight married couples, and finally gay male couples to have the lowest 
poverty rates.  
Two studies have looked at the poverty rates of LGB versus straight families 
specifically. Albelda et al. (2009) used 2000 Census data along with data from the 
National Survey of Family growth and the California Health Interview Survey to conduct 
the first study of LBG poverty, and found that both gay and lesbian couples were more 
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likely to be in poverty than different-sex married couples. The present study builds on 
that work by using a more recent data sample and by doing decomposition of the poverty 
rate difference for same-sex versus different-sex couple households. This decomposition 
allows us to see how the characteristics of the different couple types, and the potentially 
different returns to those characteristics, affect the chances of the different households 
being in poverty. Prokos & Keene (2010) also use 2000 Census data to calculate poverty 
rates for different household types, and find that both male and female same-sex couples 
have higher poverty rates than different-sex married couples, but lower rates than 
unmarried different-sex couples. However, Prokos & Keene (2010) only include 
households with children in their analysis – an unfortunate subsample if one wants to 
make conclusions about the broader same-sex couple population. The present study is 
therefore the first to offer an analysis of the poverty rates of the entire coupled LGB 
population and give insight into which specific characteristics of that population increase 
or decrease their likelihood of being in poverty.  
 
Measuring Poverty 
Poverty is a complex concept and as such, its measurement is not straightforward. 
Two measurement concepts dominate the literature.
17
 First, poverty may be seen as a 
relational concept; in this framework, the poor can be counted as anyone in the lowest 
fifth (or tenth, or third) of the income distribution. The relational measure of poverty 
                                                 
17
 A conceptualization of poverty which looks beyond income or expenditure as a measure of well-being is 
so-called “multi-dimensional poverty,” which relates traditional income or expenditure poverty to 
substandard social (economic, political, and civic or cultural) inclusion, economic well-being, and 
capability (e.g. educational attainment, health, and self-respect).  There are quantitative measures of multi-
dimensional poverty in the literature (e.g. Wagle 2008; Kakwani and Silber 2008). None discuss sexual 
orientation explicitly.  
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therefore considers one’s economic standing in relation to that of others. When some 
people or households have access to a certain level of resources beyond that available to 
others, the “have-nots” can be considered impoverished. From this relational perspective, 
poverty will exist as long as there is income and/or wealth inequality. 
A second way of measuring poverty is in absolute terms. This approach employs 
the idea that there is some minimum level of goods and services that people need or 
should have. People or households who do not have the resources to access those goods 
and services are then considered poor. This is the official approach taken by the US 
government. The official poverty rate in the US is calculated as the percent of people 
with an income below a certain level. 
The official US poverty thresholds – the minimum income that a family of a 
certain size would need to not be considered in poverty – were developed in 1963 by 
Mollie Orshansky of the Social Security Administration. Orshansky used data from the 
1955 Household Food Consumption Survey to estimate the minimum expenditure 
necessary for a nutritionally adequate diet for families of different compositions and sizes 
(number and age of household members), but not geographical locations. The poverty 
thresholds have not been updated since their original creation, but are adjusted each year 
to keep up with inflation based on the Consumer Price Index. Critics of this measure of 
poverty argue that this method of measuring, developed in the 1960s to measure the 
minimum income necessary to purchase the food necessary for subsistence, is no longer 
relevant to today’s lifestyle and needs (Shaw 1995; Schiller 2004).  
In response to these critiques, the Census Bureau has created an alternative 
Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) to better take into account the resources available 
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to families and the expenses that they have. Unlike the official poverty measures which 
only consider income as a financial resource, the SPM considers in-kind government 
program benefits and child support payments as part of a family’s resources. The SPM 
also aims to better account for people’s basic needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, work 
expenses, and medical costs by including these costs in the calculation of a reasonable 
poverty threshold. The resulting thresholds in the SPM are higher than the official 
poverty thresholds, and the poverty rates calculated using the SPM are higher for some 
groups, such as adults over 18 (and especially for adults over 65), but they are lower for 
individuals under 18. The SPM was 16.1 percent in 2011, and the official poverty rate 
was 15.1 percent (Short 2011).  The data required to calculate the SPM come from the 
Current Population Survey, in which there are not enough same-sex couples to do the 
analysis in this paper, so unfortunately we cannot study differences in the SPM by couple 
type. 
The present study uses data from the IPUMS sample of the 2010 American 
Community Survey (ACS) (Ruggles et al. 2010) to measure poverty in different 
household types. The ACS is an annual survey which sampled almost three million 
individuals living in the United States in 2010. The survey collects data on a vast range of 
demographic and economic information for individuals and households. Although there 
is no question on the ACS which asks directly about one’s sexual orientation, researchers 
can locate people in same-sex couples based on the relationship category used to describe 
intra-household relations. Each household has a “householder,” and this householder 
states their relationship to every other person in the household; when the householder has 
an “unmarried partner” of the same sex, these people are said to be lesbian or gay. In 
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order to reduce the probability of having the sample of same-sex couples contaminated 
by miscoded different-sex couples, this study follows the suggestions of Black et al. 
(2007b) and Gates & Steinberger (2009) and drops any observation for which the 
householder or the householder’s spouse or partner has an imputed value for his/her 
marital status and who mailed in their completed survey (see Gates & Steinberger 2009 
for details on locating same-sex couples in the Census and ACS data). This restriction 
reduces the amount of same-sex couples in the 2010 sample by about 20 percent, but it 
substantially reduces the chance of miscoding different-sex couples as lesbian or gay. 
I use the official poverty threshold for 2010 set out by the US Census Bureau. A 
person or household is considered to be in poverty if their household income falls below 
the Federal Poverty Line (FPL). The FPL is based family size and the number of children 
in the household, as well as the age of the householder (65 and older, or not). The Census 
Bureau considers a “family” to be people who live in the same housing unit and who are 
related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Since this definition excludes same-sex couples, 
who are not recognized as married at the federal level given the Defense of Marriage Act, 
I amend the Census Bureau’s definition of family to be any cohabiting couple (married or 
unmarried partners) along with all children under 18 living in the same household. Such 
an amendment to the definition of a family in measuring poverty to include unmarried but 
cohabiting partners as family members entered the literature in the 1990s (Ruggles 1990; 
Citro & Michael 1995; Carlson & Danzinger 1999). Indeed the National Research 
Council (Citro & Michael 1995) recommended that the definition of “family” be 
extended to include cohabiting partners. Some estimates show that extending the 
definition of family to include unmarried partners reduces the poverty rates of up to 11 
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percent for couples or their children, because the income of the unmarried partner brings 
the new “family” income above the poverty line for these households (Carlson & 
Danzinger 1999). In order to estimate comparable poverty rates across couple types, we 
must include the income of the householder and the householder’s spouse or unmarried 
partner: without the partner’s income, unmarried people would be more likely to be in 
poverty than married people, whose spouses’ income always get counted in poverty rate 
estimates.    
Accordingly, I consider household income, which is used to compare against the 
FPL, to be the summation of the total income of the two members of the householder 
couple (householder and his/her spouse or unmarried partner). Total income is – as 
originally defined by the Census Bureau in poverty measurement – the sum of income 
from all sources, such as earnings, pensions, and interest. I exclude households where the 
value of any component of total income for either one of the members of the couple was 
given a data quality flag by the Census Bureau from the sample. Data quality flags are 
assigned to variables that had a missing value as a response; excluding households with 
the data quality flags reduces the poverty rates comparably for each household type. The 
first rows in table 1 give the overall household poverty rates by household type. 
In 2010, 6.1% of all couple-led households were in poverty. This rate varies 
drastically based on the sexual orientation and marital status of the couple leading the 
household. Households headed by unmarried different-sex couples had the highest 
poverty rate of all couple types; 14.1% of these households were in poverty compared to 
5.3% of married different-sex couple households. Same-sex male couple households had 
a lower poverty rate than different-sex married couple households (3.2%), but lesbian-led 
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households had a higher rate (7.5%). The differences in these rates are statistically 
significant across all couple types.   
 What can explain the differences in the poverty rates for the various household 
types? Research on poverty has identified several key determinants of poverty; namely 
the race, ethnicity, education level, employment status, age, disability status, and English 
fluency of both people in the couple are important determinants of income (and therefore 
poverty), along with the geographical location of a household (region or state and 
metropolitan area size) and the number of children and adults living in the household.  
I create household-level variables based on the main characteristics which explain 
poverty to investigate the relationship between these characteristics and poverty for the 
different couple types. It is important that these variables capture household-level, not 
just person-level information, because the characteristics of both partners in the couple 
matter in determining poverty, not just the characteristics of one of the couple’s 
members. For example, instead of an looking at just one person’s race, I calculate the 
couple’s racial composition: both white, both African American, both Asian, both Native 
American, both “other” race, interracial couple with a white person, or interracial couple 
with neither person white.  
A person is considered disabled if they reported having cognitive, ambulatory, 
independent living, self-care, vision, or hearing difficulty. People cannot speak English 
fluently if they report that they cannot speak English or cannot speak it well. Because of 
the confidentiality requirements of the Census Bureau, almost 30% of cases in the 2010 
data have an “unknown central city status.” I therefore use measure of a household’s 
degree of urbanity/ruralness given by the so-called Beale scale (named after Calvin 
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Beale, the researcher at the US Department of Agriculture who developed the scheme), 
which ranges from 1-9 and increases with ruralness.
18
 The means of these household 
characteristics for the different household types are given in table 3.1.  
 The descriptive statistics in table 1 provide several important pieces of 
information in beginning to explain the varying poverty levels for same-sex versus 
different-sex and married and unmarried couple households. Same-sex couples are more 
likely to have several characteristics that serve as protection against poverty, such as high 
levels of education, being employed, and being fluent in English. However, same-sex 
couples are less likely to be composed of two white partners, and they are much younger 
than different-sex married couples. Different-sex couples – both married and unmarried – 
are more likely to have children than same-sex couples and when comparing households 
with at least one child, different-sex couples have more children than same-sex couples.  
Poverty rates vary considerably by the various subgroups presented in table 1. 
Table 3.2 shows the poverty rates for the couples with different characteristics. We can 
see, for example, that both male and female same-sex couples are more likely to be 
interracial than different-sex married couples (from table 3.1), and the poverty rates for 
                                                 
18
 The county typology codes are based on the status of the county as measured in the 
2000 census. The designations are as follows: 1= County in metropolitan area with a 
population of at least 1 million; 2= County in metropolitan area with a population 
between 250,000 and 1 million; 3= County in metropolitan area with a population less 
than 250,000, 4= Non-metropolitan county with an urban population of 20,000+, adjacent 
to a metropolitan area; 5= Non-metropolitan county with urban pop of 20,000+, not 
adjacent to a metropolitan area; 6= Non-metropolitan county with urban pop of 2,500-
19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area; 7= Non-metropolitan county with urban pop of 
2,500-19,999, not adjacent to a metropolitan area; 8= Non- metropolitan county 
completely rural or less than 2,500 urban pop, adjacent to metro area; 9= Non- 
metropolitan county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban pop, not adjacent to a 
metropolitan area. The codes I use are a weighted average (based on population) of the 
Beale Code for each PUMA. Thanks go to Gary Gates for providing this information and 
data. 
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both gay and lesbian interracial couples are higher than for married straight interracial 
couples. Gay couples are less likely to be composed of two African Americans than 
straight married couples, but lesbian couples are more likely. Both gay and lesbian 
African American couples are more likely to be in poverty than straight married African 
American couples (although the difference is only statistically significant for lesbians).  
 While these descriptive statistics are illuminating, they do not allow us to 
establish a clear relationship between sexual orientation, marital status and poverty. To 
do that, we need to compare people of different sexual orientations and marital statuses in 
households with the same characteristics. The next section describes how this is done. 
 
Multivariate Analysis Methods 
To focus more directly on the link between sexual orientation/marital status and 
poverty, we need to compare households which differ in their sexual orientation or 
marital status, but which are identical in all other (observable) characteristics which could 
be related to poverty. For example, instead of comparing any random household headed 
by a gay male couple to any random household headed by a different-sex married couple, 
a multivariate regression model allows us to compare a gay male household and a 
different-sex married household whose leading couples have the same compositions of 
race and ethnicity, educational attainment, age, employment status, fluency in English, 
and disability, and which are in the same state, have a similar degree of rural/urbanity, 
and has the same number of children and adults. “Controlling” for these other 
characteristics allows us to highlight the role of sexual orientation/marital status in 
particular in predicting poverty.  
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 Because the outcome variable of interest – being in poverty or not – is a 
dichotomous variable, I employ a probit regression. A probit model is preferable to an 
Ordinary Least Squares model when the dependent variable is dichotomous, because (1) 
an OLS model would predict values outside of the [0, 1] range, which we know cannot 
occur when there are only two outcome choices, and (2) an OLS model with a 
dichotomous outcome would violate the assumption that the error terms are normally 
distributed (producing heteroskedasticity), making the standard errors (and t-tests) 
invalid. The probit model gives us the probability that an outcome occurs (   ), given 
certain values of our independent variables in  : 
  
          
            
 .                                         (3.1) 
Because of the non-linear form of the underlying function in the probit regression, a one 
unit change in one of our   variables does not simply translate to a constant effect on the 
outcome variable  .  Therefore, to find the marginal effect of any independent variable 
on  , in this case being in poverty, we take all other variables at their means. The 
resulting coefficients can be interpreted as the change in probability of an event 
happening (being in poverty) when an independent variable   takes on a certain value 
(e.g. being in a same-sex couple), holding all other variables in the model at their means. 
 Along with finding the marginal effects of sexual orientation on the probability of 
being in poverty, we are also interested in seeing if the other independent variables in 
equation 1 have a different impact on the probability of being in poverty for households 
headed by different-sex versus same-sex couples. In a model whose underlying function 
is linear, the standard approach for decomposing the difference in an outcome across two 
groups into the portion explained by differences in the characteristics and differences in 
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the returns to these characteristics is the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition, modeled 
as 
   ̅̅ ̅̅     ̅̅ ̅̅  (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(       )  (       )  (3.2) 
for sexual orientation groups SS (same-sex) and DS (different-sex).  
 Yun (2004) provides an extension to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
methodology for non-linear models, including the probit regression, showing that the 
decomposition for the binary probit model is essentially the same as for the OLS model. 
The decomposition for probit models is available as a standard option in the Stata 
package oaxaca. An example of the use of this decomposition to analyze the poverty 
incidence (in India) is given in Gang et al. (2008).  
 
Results: Explaining the sexual orientation gap in poverty rates 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the multivariate probit models giving the 
contribution of being in a gay or lesbian couple on the probability of being in poverty. 
The results in column 1 show that controlling for the race, ethnicity, employment, 
education, age, English fluency, and disability compositions of a household, along with 
the number of adults and children in the home and the house’s region and degree of 
ruralness, both same-sex and different-sex unmarried couples are more likely than 
different-sex married couples to be in poverty. Lesbians are most likely to be in poverty, 
confirming the expectations laid out earlier in the paper; they are 3.1 percentage points 
more likely to be in poverty than different-sex married couples. Gay couples are 1.2 
percentage points more likely to be in poverty than different-sex married couples, 
although less likely than different-sex unmarried couples, who are 2.3 percentage points 
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more likely than different-sex married couples to be in poverty. The fact that lesbian 
couples are more likely to be in poverty than all other couple types, once controlling for 
other observable differences, undermines a popular interpretation of the “lesbian wage 
premium” literature. If lesbian earn more than an straight women on average (Badgett 
2001; Clain & Leppel 2001, Berg & Lien 2002; Black et al. 2003; Blandford 2003; 
Jepson 2007; Antecol et al. 2008; Baumle et al. 2009; Cushing-Daniels & Yeung 2009), 
then we might not see higher poverty rates for lesbian couples because their composite 
earnings might be high enough to match the combined incomes of a straight man and 
woman. However, the fact that within many lesbian couples only one of the members of 
the couple has a wage premium while her partner faces a wage penalty – as shown in the 
first paper in this dissertation – can explain the finding that the household-level earnings 
of same-sex females is clearly lower than it is for different-sex married couples.  
The results in table 3.3 also allow us to compare the marginal probability of being 
in poverty for same-sex couples versus different-sex unmarried couples. Subtracting one 
effect from the other in the first column, we see that same-sex male couples are 1.1 
percentage points less likely to be in poverty than different-sex unmarried couples. 
Lesbian couples, on the other hand, are 0.8 percentage points more likely to be in poverty 
than different-sex unmarried couples. 
We now turn to the question of the driving forces behind the different poverty 
rates for couples with different sexual orientations. Are the differences across couple type 
due mainly to the couples’ characteristics, or is it the effects of those characteristics 
which play a larger role? Columns 2-5 of table 3.3 present the probit regression for the 
different subpopulations, and table 3.4 decomposes the difference in the likelihood of 
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being in poverty for gay couples versus to married and unmarried straight couples; table 
3.5 does the same for lesbians. Here the states have been compressed into regions; the 
Midwest is omitted.  
Table 3.4 shows that the difference in the poverty rate of gay male couples and 
different-sex married couples is explained predominantly by the different characteristics 
these couples have. Indeed these characteristics over-determine gay couples’ lower 
poverty rates. The largest driver of gay couples’ protection from poverty is having fewer 
children in the household; this characteristic explains 90 percent (.0185/.0206) of the 
poverty gap between gay couples and straight married couples. Gay couples’ higher 
education levels are the other main factor keeping the poverty rates of gay couples low. 
Lower rates of having a Hispanic member of the couple is another factor related to gay 
couples’ low poverty rates. On the other hand, gay male couples’ young age and the 
lower chance of having other adults in the household are characteristics which put them 
at higher risk of being in poverty. The number of adults in the household is perhaps 
related to poverty in the sense that poorer couples are more likely to live with other 
adults, to pool resources. The gay couples with more adults in their household may 
therefore have higher rates than other gay couples, so a higher number of adults in the 
household is associated with higher chances of being in poverty.  
 The returns to the characteristics of same-sex male and different-sex married 
couples do not differ in a statistically significant way. This means that gay couples seem 
to have the same returns to their characteristics than different-sex married couples.  
 Comparing gay couples to different-sex unmarried couples, a very similar story 
emerges. Differences in education are the main driver of gay couples’ lower poverty 
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rates. While gay couples tend to be younger than married straight couples, they are often 
older than unmarried straight couples, and this helps keeps their poverty rates lower than 
unmarried straight couples. The coefficient on the characteristic of having more adults in 
the household is positive, which means that gay couples with more adults in the 
household are more likely to be in poverty. As discussed above, this is perhaps a 
selection effect: poor couples may be more likely to have other adults in their household 
in order to share resources with the additional adult(s).   
 The probit models for gay male couples show that while the poverty rates for gay 
couples is lower than for straight married couples, gay couples face greater vulnerability 
to poverty when we hold the characteristics of the couples constant. The Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions show that it is mainly differences in employment, education, and the 
number of children in the household which keep gay couples out of poverty, compared to 
straight couples. Further, there are not significantly different returns to the characteristics, 
which says that these characteristics seem to work similarly for male same-sex couples 
and different-sex couples in predicting poverty.   
 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the difference in poverty rates between 
lesbians and straight women is given in table 3.5. Overall, lesbian couples have 
characteristics which protect them from being in poverty, but face lower returns on these 
beneficial characteristics, which drive their poverty rate above straight married couples’. 
Lesbian couples benefit from their higher education levels, more hours spent in the labor 
force, and being less likely to have children. Most notable in the decomposition of lesbian 
versus straight married poverty rates is that lesbians have important characteristics which 
protect them from poverty, but receive lower returns to these beneficial characteristics 
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than straight married couples. Although each individual estimate for the returns of 
various characteristics presented in table 3.5 lack statistical significance, as a whole it is 
these returns which push lesbian poverty rates higher than married straight couples’. The 
characteristic with the most differentiated returns for lesbian couples and straight married 
couples is employment, especially at the intensive margin. The fact that lesbian couples 
are much more likely to have both partners working full time and less likely to have 
neither partner working zero hours (see table 3.1) serves as the biggest protection from 
poverty for lesbian couples compared to different-sex married couples. 
 Decomposing the poverty rate difference for lesbian couples and different-sex 
unmarried couples, we can clearly see that lesbian couples’ characteristics over-predict 
their lower poverty rates; however, again, lesbians suffer from less positive returns to 
these beneficial characteristics compared to their straight counterparts. Lesbian couples’ 
higher education, higher age, higher number of hours spent working, and lower 
probability of having children protect them from poverty vis-à-vis unmarried different-
sex couples. Although the sample sizes for the various characteristics are too low, which 
drives up the standard errors of the estimates of the returns for each characteristic and 
makes them statistically insignificant, we can see that there is a significant overall 
difference in the returns to these characteristics for lesbian and straight unmarried 
couples. Lesbian couples have better returns on their employment status and household 
composition, but they face negative returns on their city dwelling, educational attainment, 
and especially their age.  
 Overall, the Oaxaca-Blinder results show that while gay and lesbian couples often 
have characteristics which protect them from poverty, they experience lower returns to 
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these endowments which might put them at a higher risk of being in poverty. Indeed 
controlling for those characteristics, as in the first column of table 3.3, shows that 
households headed by gay and lesbian couples are more likely to be in poverty than those 
households led by a straight married couple. The decomposition of the poverty gap helps 
to show that it is often the lower returns to their positive characteristics which increase 
the risk of poverty for same-sex couples. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 Despite a prevalent myth of gay affluence (Badgett 2001), same-sex couples are 
more likely than similar married different-sex counterparts to be in poverty. Oaxaca-
Blinder decompositions of poverty rates for the different household types show that while 
same-sex couples have many characteristics which protect them from being in poverty, 
they experience lower returns to these endowments. Lesbian couples in particular suffer 
from low returns on characteristics such as their high educational attainment. 
  Gay and lesbian couples face social stigma and discrimination, which are barriers 
to economic security. Perhaps in part to counteract these negative forces, same-sex 
couples often have higher employment participation and educational attainment. The 
multivariate model predicting poverty presented in this paper showed that without those 
characteristics, gay male couple and especially lesbian couple households would be at 
significantly higher risk of poverty compared to married different-sex couple households. 
Although same-sex couples have lower poverty rates than unmarried different-sex 
couples, taking away these protective characteristics also makes lesbian couples more 
susceptible to impoverishment than different-sex unmarried couples.  
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 There is, therefore, some negative effect of being gay or lesbian on a person’s or 
couple’s economic security. Public policy could be implemented to protect gay and 
lesbian people and their families; implementing federal anti-discrimination legislation 
and a nation-wide right to marry for same-sex couples would be important steps in 
counteracting the negative stigma towards gays and lesbians.  
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Table 3.1: Household Poverty Rates and Descriptive Statistics by Household Type 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Percent in Poverty 5.3 14.1** 3.2**°° 7.5**°° 6.1 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000)
Couple Characteristics
Race of Couple
Both White  80.7 72.0** 80.3°° 77.7**°° 79.9
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.000)
Both African American  5.4 8.3** 1.7**°° 6.4*°° 5.7
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000)
Both Native American  0.2 0.6** 0.2°° 0.1*°° 0.2
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Both Asian  4.6 1.3** 0.9**° 0.8**°° 4.3
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Both Other Race  3.1 5.8** 1.3**°° 2.6*°° 3.4
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
Interracial - With White  5.3 10.6** 14.4**°° 11.1** 5.8
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
Interracial - Without White  0.6 1.5** 1.2* 1.4* 0.7
(0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.000)
Ethnicity of Couple
Neither Hispanic  86.2 77.3** 82.4**°° 84.7*°° 85.3
(0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000)
One Hispanic  4.6 8.5** 12.7**°° 9.5**° 5.0
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000)
Both Hispanic  9.3 14.3** 4.9**°° 5.8**°° 9.7
(0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000)
Employment of Couple - 
Extensive
Both Unemployed  0.5 1.9** 1.2**°° 0.6°° 0.7
(0.005) (0.019) (0.012) (0.006) (0.000)
Both NILF  16.0 6.5** 7.6**° 5.5**° 15.1
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000)
Both Employed  48.8 55.8** 63.2**°° 67.6**°° 49.6
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.001)
Unemployed/Employed  6.0 12.8** 9.1**°° 8.2**°° 6.7
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Employed/NILF  27.0 20.2** 17.3**°° 16.9**°° 26.3
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001)
Unemployed/NILF  1.5 2.8** 1.7°° 1.3°° 1.7
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Sexual Orientation/Marital Status of Head Couple
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Table 3.1 continued… 
 
 
Employment of Couple - 
Intensive
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Both No Work 15.2 7.3** 7.7** 5.8**°° 14.4
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Both Part Time 2.7 5.3** 3.2°° 4.0**°° 2.9
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Both Full Time 35.3 41.3** 51.5**°° 53.1**°° 36.0
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
Part-Time/Full Time 18.1 21.1** 17.3°° 20.0* 18.4
(0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.000)
No Work/Part Time 6.3 6.7** 4.7**°° 4.5**°° 6.3
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
No Work/Full Time 22.5 18.3** 15.7**°° 12.7**°° 22.1
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.000)
Householder Age
Under 24  1.5 14.4** 2.9**°° 5.9**°° 2.7
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
25-34  14.7 36.5** 17.6**°° 21.4**°° 16.7
(0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.000)
35-49  33.3 29.5** 43.6**°° 40.4**°° 33.0
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
50-64  32.3 15.5** 28.1**°° 26.6**°° 30.7
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
65+  18.2 4.1** 7.8**°° 5.7**°° 16.8
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
Spouse/Partner Age
Partner Older  8.9 15.2** 13.7**° 16.7**° 9.5
(0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000)
Partner Younger  15.1 20.9** 28.0**°° 23.1**°° 15.7
(0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.000)
Partner Same Age  76.0 63.8** 58.3**°° 60.2**°° 74.8
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
Education of Couple
Both Less Than High School  5.2 7.3** 2.0**°° 1.4**°° 5.3
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
Both High School Degree  30.0 37.1** 19.3**°° 23.0**°° 30.6
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
Both More Than High School  30.1 16.9** 39.4**°° 43.9**°° 29.0
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
LTHS/HS  8.2 14.4** 3.9**°° 4.8**°° 8.8
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
MTHS/HS  24.9 22.3** 33.8**°° 25.9°° 24.7
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.000)
MTHS/LTHS  1.6 2.0** 1.7 1.1*°° 1.6
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
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Table 3.1 continued… 
 
 
 
English Fluency of Couple
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Both Speak English  93.7 92.3** 97.4**°° 97.9**°° 93.6
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
One Speaks English  3.2 3.8** 1.7**°° 1.5**°° 3.3
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
Neither Speak English  3.0 3.9** 0.9**°° 0.6**°° 3.1
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Disability of Couple
Neither Disabled  82.1 85.1** 84.2** 84.4** 82.4
(0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000)
One Disabled  14.0 11.9** 13.3° 12.8* 13.8
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
Both Disabled  3.9 3.0** 2.5**° 2.8** 3.8
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Region
New England  4.8 5.6** 5.4 7.2**°° 4.9
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
Mid-Atlantic  12.6 12.5 13.8*° 12.2 12.6
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000)
East North Central  15.9 16.4** 11.5**°° 13.8**°° 15.9
(0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000)
West North Central  7.6 7.4* 7.1° 6.3** 7.6
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000)
South Atlantic  18.8 17.6** 19.4° 17.7 18.7
(0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000)
East South Central  6.1 5.2** 3.9**°° 4.2**° 6.0
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
West South Central  11.3 10.1** 10.0* 11.3° 11.1
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000)
Mountain  7.4 7.7** 7.0 9.6**°° 7.4
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Pacific  15.6 17.5** 21.8**°° 17.7* 15.8
(0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.000)
Metropolitan Size
Large  49.5 50.6** 67.9**°° 57.5**°° 49.7
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
Medium  19.8 19.9 18.1*° 21.7*° 19.8
(0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.000)
Small  8.4 8.8* 5.8**°° 7.0**°° 8.4
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
Non-Metro  22.3 20.7** 8.3**°° 13.8**°° 22.1
(0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000)
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Household Composition
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Number of Adults 2.3 2.2** 2.2**°° 2.2**°° 2.3
(0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001)
Any Children Present 45.0 42.8** 7.7**°° 27.9**°° 44.6
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.001)
Number of Children, when any 1.93 1.87** 1.67**° 1.75**° 1.92
(0.002) (0.007) (0.078) (0.047) (0.002)
Observations 962,826 83,056 3,950 3,962 1,053,794
Notes: Author's calculations on ACS 2010. In columns 2, 3 and 4 a statistically significant difference in 
means, relative to column 1, is indicated by * (p<.10) or ** (p<.01). Additionally in columns 3 and 4 a 
statistically significant difference in means, relative to column 2, is indicated by ° (p<.10) or °° (p<.01). 
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Table 3.2: Poverty Rates by Household Type and Couple Characteristics 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Overall 5.3 14.1** 3.2**°° 7.5**°° 6.1 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000)
Couple Characteristics
Race of Couple
Both White  4.5 12.1** 2.7**°° 5.1°° 5.1
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
Both African American  7.8 21.3** 11.3° 22.0** 9.7
(0.002) (0.007) (0.042) (0.043) (0.002)
Both Native American  18.9 33.2** n/a n/a 21.9
(0.011) (0.025) (0.010)
Both Asian  7.2 9.6* 15.0 n/a 7.2
(0.002 (0.010) (0.072) (0.002)
Both Other Race  19.0 30.2** 14.3°° 31.6* 20.8
(0.003) (0.009) (0.056) (0.064) (0.003)
Interracial - With White  5.1 12.6** 3.6°° 9.8* 6.4
(0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.021) (0.001)
Interracial - Without White  6.4 15.2** n/a 18.2* 8.2
(0.004) (0.013) (0.061) (0.004)
Ethnicity of Couple
Neither Hispanic  3.9 11.7** 2.8**°° 6.8**°° 4.6
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000)
One Hispanic  4.9 11.6** 2.1**°° 5.1°° 5.9
(0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.001)
Both Hispanic  18.6 28.7** 14.0°° 21.5° 20.0
(0.002) (0.005) (0.036) (0.037) (0.002)
Employment of Couple - 
Extensive
Both Unemployed  35.8 53.4** 31.9° 64.0* 40.5
(0.009) (0.015) (0.086) (0.117) (0.008)
Both NILF  9.0 34.8** 9.8°° 28.2** 10.1
(0.001) (0.008) (0.020) (0.039) (0.001)
Both Employed  1.3 3.5** 1.3°° 2.4*° 1.5
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000)
Unemployed/Employed  8.9 18.7** 1.4**°° 14.7* 10.6
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.030) (0.002)
Employed/NILF  7.6 24.3** 2.8**°° 11.5**°° 8.8
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015) (0.001)
Unemployed/NILF  29.6 56.9** 40.2° 44.1 40.0
(0.005 (0.012) (0.071) (0.090) (0.005)
Sexual Orientation/Marital Status of Head Couple
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Table 3.2 continued… 
 
Employment of Couple - 
Intensive
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Both No Work 10.9 41.6** 17.5*°° 40.2** 12.5
(0.001) (0.007) (0.027) (0.043) (0.001)
Both Part Time 15.7 37.4** 9.6*°° 34.9** 19.4
(0.003) (0.009) (0.025) (0.051) (0.003)
Both Full Time 0.4 0.8** 0.7 0.8 0.5
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000)
Part-Time/Full Time 2.7 7.9** 2.5°° 4.8*°° 3.2
(0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.001)
No Work/Part Time 17.4 50.0** 13.8°° 40.4**° 20.6
(0.002) (0.008) (0.029) (0.048) (0.002)
No Work/Full Time 6.7 20.5** 0.9**°° 4.6*°° 7.8
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.001)
Householder Age
24 and below 17.9 23.6** 16.5 22.3 20.7
(0.004) (0.005) (0.047) (0.036) (0.003)
25-34  9.4 14.7** 2.1**°° 14.2** 10.5
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.018) (0.001)
35-49  5.8 13.4** 3.1**°° 4.6°° 6.4
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001)
50-64  3.6 8.1** 3.0°° 3.4°° 3.8
(0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.000)
65+  3.2 2.8 2.1 6.5 3.1
(0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.024) (0.000)
Spouse/Partner Age
Partner Older  7.2 16.8** 2.7**°° 7.2°° 8.6
(0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.001)
Partner Younger  6.6 14.0** 4.9*°° 11.2** 7.5
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.017) (0.001)
Partner Same Age  4.9 13.5** 2.5**°° 6.2*°° 5.5
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000)
Education of Couple
Both Less Than High School  25.8 43.8** 20.4°° 44.1* 28.1
(0.003) (0.008) (0.057) (0.080) (0.003)
Both High School Degree  5.7 13.6** 6.2°° 12.3** 6.6
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.016) (0.001)
Both More Than High School  1.3 2.9** 0.7**°° 1.6°° 1.4
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000)
LTHS/HS  13.9 27.6** 18.5° 44.8**°° 16.1
(0.002) (0.005) (0.045) (0.051) (0.002)
MTHS/HS  2.4 4.6** 1.8*°° 3.2° 2.6
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.000)
MTHS/LTHS  8.4 16.8** 1.7**°° 37.0**° 9.5
(0.002) (0.011) (0.012) (0.099) (0.003)
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English Fluency of Couple
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Both Speak English  4.0 12.2** 2.9**°° 6.9**°° 4.7
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000)
One Speaks English  19.6 30.9** 4.4**°° 25.6 20.8
(0.003) (0.011) (0.023) (0.081) (0.003)
Neither Speak English  32.2 43.6** 39.0 65.7**° 33.6
(0.004) (0.011) (0.105) (0.132) (0.003)
Disability of Couple
Neither Disabled  4.7 12.7** 2.3**°° 6.8**°° 5.4
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000)
One Disabled  7.4 20.3** 8.2°° 8.0°° 8.4
(0.001) (0.005) (0.017) (0.015) (0.001)
Both Disabled  11.8 28.8** 8.6°° 25.6* 13.1
(0.002) (0.011) (0.027) (0.065) (0.002)
Region
New England  2.8 7.0** 1.7°° 9.5** 3.3
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.025) (0.001)
Mid-Atlantic  4.2 10.3** 2.0**°° 2.8°° 4.8
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.001)
East North Central  4.3 15.3** 2.2**°° 8.5*°° 5.4
(0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.019) (0.001)
West North Central  3.7 11.6** 6.7° 12.2** 4.5
(0.001) (0.006) (0.023) (0.029) (0.001)
South Atlantic  5.2 14.6** 3.7*°° 5.7°° 6.1
(0.001) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001)
East South Central  6.6 20.0** 5.6°° 19.9°° 7.7
(0.001) (0.008) (0.023) (0.033) (0.001)
West South Central  7.3 17.0** 3.2**°° 13.2* 8.2
(0.001) (0.005) (0.012) (0.023) (0.001)
Mountain  6.2 14.5** 1.8**°° 7.0°° 7.0
(0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.017) (0.001)
Pacific  6.5 14.9** 3.4**°° 5.0°° 7.3
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001)
Metropolitan Size
Large  4.9 12.1** 2.4**°° 4.3°° 5.6
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000)
Medium  5.3 14.2** 4.9°° 11.4** 6.1
(0.001) (0.003) (0.011) (0.017) (0.001)
Small  5.2 16.5** 5.4°° 10.7*°° 6.3
(0.001) (0.006) (0.018) (0.021) (0.001)
Non-Metro  6.3 17.8** 4.9°° 13.2**° 7.3
(0.001) (0.004) (0.016) (0.020) (0.001)
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Household Composition
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
All 
Householders 
and Partners
Any Children Present 8.7 24.6** 15.7*°° 15.7**°° 10.1
(0.001) (0.003) (0.030) (0.016) (0.001)
No Children Present 2.6 6.3** 2.2°° 4.3**°° 2.9
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000)
Observations 962,826 83,056 3,950 3,962 1,053,794
Notes: Author's calculations on ACS 2010. In columns 2, 3 and 4 a statistically significant 
difference in means, relative to column 1, is indicated by * (p<.10) or ** (p<.01). Additionally in 
columns 3 and 4 a statistically significant difference in means, relative to column 2, is indicated 
by ° (p<.10) or °° (p<.01). 
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Table 3.3: Probit regression predicting being in poverty; marginal effects at mean 
 
 
 
Sexual Orientation/Marital Status All
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
(omitted: different-sex married)
   Same-Sex Male .0122433*
0.0049459
   Same-Sex Female .0313651***
0.0040542
   Different-Sex Unmarried .023498***
0.0007275
Race of Couple
(omitted: both white)
   Both Black .0305725*** .0290477*** .0338002*** 0.0129564 0.0074536
0.0011086 0.0011988 0.0033113 0.0282451 0.0186153
   Both Other Race .0223844*** .0236375*** 0.0064285 0.0379183 -0.007369
0.0009813 0.0010066 0.0036117 0.0249121 0.0243085
   Interracial, no white .0083613*** .006504* .0144429* -0.0111479 0.018601
0.0024248 0.0027537 0.0062107 0.0412137 0.0219563
   Interracial, one white .0095441*** .0082929*** .0071674* 0.0245883 .056779***
0.0012107 0.0013345 0.0033194 0.013818 0.0171324
Ethnicity of Couple
(omitted: neither Hispanic)
   Both Hispanic .0258019*** .0256264*** .0321163*** .078069*** 0.0401641
0.0009512 0.0009873 0.0033423 0.0207772 0.0215283
   One Hispanic .0067154*** .0084177*** -0.0021289 -0.0193075 0.0146542
0.0014022 0.001532 0.0039365 0.0170198 0.0234819
English Fluency
(omitted: both speak English)
   One speaks English .0245078*** .0262837*** .0115437* -.1680008** -0.0035491
0.0013319 0.0013732 0.0047672 0.0514987 0.0320127
   Neither speaks English .0303871*** .0343781*** 0.0001661 0.0279417 -.1080761***
0.0011753 0.0012194 0.0040587 0.0265613 0.0295559
Employment of Couple - Extensive
(omitted: both employed)
   Both Unemployed .0986355*** .0996945*** .0987974*** .1495437*** 0.0357518
0.0021912 0.0024467 0.0056822 0.03164 0.0379429
   Both NILF .0772516*** .0749436*** .1114598*** .0610156* 0.0315306
0.0013541 0.0014016 0.0050219 0.0303532 0.0305664
   Unemployed; employed .049232*** .0508999*** .0443781*** -0.0159631 0.0199981
0.0012328 0.0013371 0.0035004 0.0297929 0.0193258
   Employed; NILF .0451633*** .0457011*** .050733*** 0.0180506 0.0281552
0.0011621 0.0012286 0.0036315 0.0243476 0.0263208
   Unemployed; NILF .0979164*** .0951948*** .1180112*** .1355533*** .0667053*
0.0016002 0.0017039 0.0051047 0.0305472 0.0313616
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Table 3.3 continued… 
 
 
All
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
Employment of Couple - Intensive
(omitted: both don't work)
   Both Part Time .0279983*** .0284854*** .0182127*** 0.0278207 -0.0438422
0.0014801 0.001582 0.004692 0.0288124 0.0268334
   Both Full Time -.1100756*** -.0993753*** -.1862952*** -0.0593025 -.2504548***
0.0016611 0.0017421 0.0056762 0.0331659 0.0336675
   Part Time; Full Time -.0611564*** -.0570417*** -.0955206*** -0.0401992 -.1746289***
0.0013472 0.0014067 0.0046292 0.0279469 0.030826
   Part time; No Work .0202756*** .0173992*** .0357404*** 0.0075933 -0.0337138
0.0010933 0.0011273 0.0043269 0.0205957 0.0262642
   Full Time; No Work -.0555663*** -.0547091*** -.0664497*** -.125519*** -.1978424***
0.0013005 0.0013559 0.0045972 0.0329579 0.0334723
Age
(omitted: both 50-64)
Householder <25 .0830848*** .0809214*** .1111182*** .1151079*** .1514861***
0.0012641 0.001627 0.0029001 0.0195038 0.019462
Householder 25-34 .0341895*** .033415*** .0456303*** -0.0109196 .1147192***
0.0008308 0.0008917 0.0027119 0.015826 0.0151117
Householder 35-49 .0070635*** .0056249*** .0214348*** 0.0103416 .0315808*
0.0007206 0.0007495 0.0027612 0.0119693 0.0151094
Householder 65+ -.0456126*** -.0422552*** -.1052872*** -.0544032** -0.0189246
0.0008787 0.0008794 0.0054129 0.0165613 0.0256576
Partner younger .0159482*** .0154548*** .0195764*** .0210226* .0464822***
0.0006407 0.0006776 0.0020712 0.0099292 0.0111914
Partner older -.0076444*** -.0065617*** -.0147978*** -0.0132423 -0.0160742
0.0007892 0.00086 0.0022251 0.0147481 0.0128693
Education
(omitted: both high school)
   Both more than high school -.0378979*** -.0368233*** -.0278428*** -.0492103* -.0533728**
0.0009499 0.0009764 0.0039123 0.0202083 0.017448
   More than high school; HS -.0222609*** -.0208613*** -.0281206*** -0.0280696 -.0404114*
0.0008416 0.0008738 0.0030943 0.0173496 0.0162773
    LTHS; MTHS .0105472*** .0091593*** .0162747** -.0735949* .1092325**
0.0018218 0.0019345 0.0059185 0.032829 0.0340413
   LTHS; HS .0279784*** .0265608*** .0319228*** .068504*** .1004186***
0.0008181 0.0008695 0.0025819 0.0184974 0.0164262
   Both LTHS .0448814*** .0418564*** .0630014*** 0.0575045 .065782*
0.0009823 0.001031 0.0033994 0.0328492 0.0303558
Household Characteristics
   Number of Adults -.005947*** -.0055395*** -.0102866*** -.037216*** -.0220647**
0.0003466 0.0003594 0.001213 0.0084118 0.0083741
   Number of Children .0259849*** .0245657*** .0387332*** .0362799*** .0267215***
0.0002162 0.0002267 0.0008236 0.0061921 0.0058169
   Beale - Increasingly rural .0035013*** .0034667*** .0035405*** 0.0003819 .0121807***
0.0001326 0.0001379 0.0004694 0.0029212 0.0026644
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Table 3.3 continued… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disability All
Different-Sex 
Married
Different-Sex 
Unmarried
Same-Sex 
Male
Same-Sex 
Female
(omitted: neither disabled)
   One disabled .0068037*** .0064684*** .0074935** .0369387** -0.0196578
0.000749 0.0007766 0.0027798 0.0115595 0.0167479
   Both disabled .0134998*** .0137912*** 0.005398 -0.0065954 -0.0293469
0.0011192 0.0011437 0.0047713 0.0242791 0.02272
Region
(omitted: Midwest)
   Northeast -.0040016*** -0.0016833 -.016674*** 0.0127907 -.045127**
0.000821 0.0008611 0.0027536 0.0148435 0.0149848
   South 0.0013006 .0034896*** -.0121153*** -0.010131 -.0345237*
0.0007376 0.0007771 0.0024418 0.0149082 0.0143524
   West .0072758*** .008664*** 0.0004013 0.0161148 -0.0224173
0.0006507 0.0006827 0.0022059 0.012794 0.011892
Observations 1,355,424 1,235,048 110,828 4,742 4,806
Notes: Author's calculation on ACS 2010 data. 
119 
 
Table 3.4: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for poverty rates, gay men versus straight 
 
 
 
 
Total Poverty Rate Gap
characteristics returns characteristics returns
Portion Due To… -0.0230*** 0.00242 -0.0853*** -0.0233*
(0.00585) (0.00733) (0.0116) (0.0133)
   Race 0.000195 1.13e-05 -0.00167 0.00603
(0.00183) (0.00276) (0.00298) (0.0130)
   Ethnicity -0.00372*** -0.00232 -0.00742** 0.0164
(0.00144) (0.0154) (0.00298) (0.0185)
   English fluency -0.00167 0.00159 -0.00337 -0.00189
(0.00131) (0.0109) (0.00239) (0.00910)
   Employment - Extensive 4.76e-05 0.00742 -0.000569 -0.0336
(0.00379) (0.0523) (0.00255) (0.0499)
   Employment - Intensive -0.00786* -0.0309 -0.00556* 0.169
(0.00410) (0.215) (0.00288) (0.208)
   Age 0.0142*** -0.00642 -0.0140** -0.0205
(0.00371) (0.0424) (0.00590) (0.0553)
   Education -0.0106*** 0.00339 -0.0308*** -0.0112
(0.00312) (0.0265) (0.00642) (0.0331)
   Disability 0.000178 -0.00104 0.000638* 0.00522
(0.000404) (0.00712) (0.000355) (0.00720)
   Number of Adults 0.00731*** 0.0947 0.00376*** -0.288
(0.00255) (0.643) (0.00117) (0.308)
   Number of Children -0.0185*** -0.000953 -0.0238*** -0.0137
(0.00628) (0.0112) (0.00786) (0.0265)
   Ruralness -0.00182 0.00206 -0.00233 -0.00484
(0.00232) (0.0134) (0.00295) (0.0271)
   Region -0.000798 -0.00251 -0.000203 0.0293
(0.000896) (0.0205) (0.00106) (0.0487)
Source: Author's calculation on ACS 2010 data. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Straight Married           
versus Gay
Straight Unmarried       
versus Gay
-0.0206*** -0.109***
(0.00276) (0.00305)
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Table 3.5: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for poverty rates, lesbian versus straight 
 
 
 
Total Poverty Rate Gap
characteristics returns characteristics returns
Portion Due To… -0.0155** 0.0375*** -0.106*** 0.0400***
(0.00645) (0.00779) (0.00811) (0.0100)
   Race 0.00139* -0.0139 0.000739 0.00314
(0.000843) (0.0387) (0.00161) (0.00887)
   Ethnicity 0.000148 -0.00151 -0.000991 0.00710
(0.000597) (0.0198) (0.00205) (0.0117)
   English fluency -0.00161* 0.00725 -0.00525** 0.00558
(0.000898) (0.0222) (0.00210) (0.00617)
   Employment - Extensive 0.000482 -0.0710 1.13e-05 -0.0279
(0.00233) (0.180) (0.00245) (0.0235)
   Employment - Intensive -0.0181*** -0.696 -0.0208*** -0.209
(0.00597) (1.726) (0.00365) (0.139)
   Age 0.0124*** -0.00611 -0.0319*** 0.0278
(0.00350) (0.0898) (0.00408) (0.0503)
   Education -0.00674** -0.0227 -0.0355*** 0.00167
(0.00267) (0.0762) (0.00613) (0.0199)
   Disability 0.000386* -0.0477 -8.90e-06 -0.0110
(0.000226) (0.114) (0.000280) (0.00748)
   Number of Adults 0.00378** -0.896 0.00235*** -0.257*
(0.00161) (2.192) (0.000872) (0.152)
   Number of Children -0.00518*** 0.00535 -0.0102*** -0.0119
(0.00199) (0.0432) (0.00216) (0.0109)
   Ruralness -0.00156** 0.0764 -0.00312*** 0.0263
(0.000780) (0.197) (0.00111) (0.0235)
   Region -0.000981* -0.182 -0.00148** -0.0428
(0.000503) (0.458) (0.000658) (0.0359)
Source: Author's calculation on ACS 2010 data. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Straight Married           
versus Lesbian
Straight Unmarried       
versus Lesbian
0.0219*** -0.0661***
(0.00365) (0.00387)
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Table A1: Means of occupational categories by sexual orientation and family status 
 
 
 
Occupational Category
Married 
Straight    
(1)
Unmarried 
Straight    
(2)
Lesbian    
(3) Primary (4)
Secondary 
(5) Primary (6)
Secondary 
(7)
Management 9.44** 7.39** 13.43 15.27 11.64 15.26 11.40*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Business Operations 3.18 2.71* 3.62 3.80 3.46 3.14 4.16
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Fiancial Specialists 3.38** 2.10 2.31 3.39 1.35** 2.37 2.25
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Computer and Math 1.77** 1.32** 3.20 4.28 2.38** 3.39 3.10
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Engineering 0.65** 0.61** 1.58 1.66 1.59 1.69 1.46
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sciences 0.88* 0.81* 1.49 1.79 1.25 1.56 1.42
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Social Services 2.41** 2.13** 4.39 4.37 4.56 4.30 4.49
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Legal Work 1.40* 1.11* 1.90 3.04 0.97** 2.16 1.62
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Education 13.34** 6.23** 9.62 9.13 9.95 9.55 9.70
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Media & Arts 1.57 1.78 1.99 1.72 2.28 2.00 1.97
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Healthcare 11.07** 7.11* 8.27 10.70 6.38** 7.77 8.82
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Healthcare Support 3.70* 5.72** 3.07 2.62 3.60 2.65 3.53
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Security & Protection 0.77** 1.05** 3.20 2.57 3.54 3.27 3.12
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Food/Serving 3.80 9.86** 3.84 3.87 3.78 4.01 3.66
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Custodial 2.10 2.99* 2.11 1.27 2.66* 1.64 2.63
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Personal Care 3.55* 4.70** 2.50 1.35 3.69** 2.06 2.99
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Sales 8.55 12.64** 9.33 7.69 10.66* 9.05 9.65
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Office Administration 22.67** 21.55** 15.12 13.80 16.54* 14.36 15.95
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Farming 0.32** 0.47** 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.04
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Construction 0.19* 0.40 0.51 0.52 0.40 0.65 0.36
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Extraction 0.01 (0 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.14
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Installation/Repair 0.25** 0.34** 1.16 0.89 1.47 1.32 0.98
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Production 3.22* 4.44 3.96 3.59 4.28 4.40 3.47
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Transportation 1.71** 2.45* 3.12 2.30 3.37 3.33 2.89
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Military 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.21
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Lesbian Division: Earner 
Definition
Lesbian Division: Roster 
Definition
Notes: Differences in the means between lesbians and straight unmarried women are indicated by * (p<.10) or ** 
(p<.01). Errors in column summation due to rounding. 
Sexual Orientation/Marital Status
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Table A2: OLS predicting log hourly wages with household roster classification of 
primary/secondary, lesbians versus straight married women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All All 
Full-Time 
Workers
Full-Time 
Workers
Lesbian Primary Position 0.042** 0.005 0.046*** 0.025
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lesbian Secondary Position -0.010 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother 0-5 0.038*** 0.043***
(0.00) (0.00)
Mother 6-12 -0.030*** -0.010**
(0.00) (0.00)
Mother 13-17 -0.028*** -0.019***
(0.00) (0.00)
Mother 18+ -0.025*** -0.032***
(0.00) (0.00)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Primary 0.087 0.161**
(0.07) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Primary 0.146** 0.076
(0.06) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Primary 0.065 0.085
(0.08) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Primary 0.000 -0.052
(0.10) (0.11)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Secondary -0.010 -0.020
(0.05) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Secondary -0.020 0.002
(0.05) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Secondary -0.005 0.016
(0.08) (0.08)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Secondary -0.008 0.080
(0.08) (0.08)
Usual Hours Worked 0.003***
(0.00)
Constant 2.378*** 2.252*** 2.340*** 2.345***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 279398 279398 178870 178870
R-squared 0.341 0.345 0.378 0.379
Notes: Author's calculation on 2010 ACS data. Standard errors in parentheses. Results for 
occupation, race, ethnicity, region, metropolitan status, education, and potential experience not 
shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1).
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Table A3: OLS predicting log hourly wages with household roster classification of 
primary/secondary, lesbians versus straight unmarried women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: All All 
Full-Time 
Workers
Full-Time 
Workers
Lesbian Primary Position 0.085*** 0.052** 0.106*** 0.073***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lesbian Secondary Position 0.029* 0.024 0.043** 0.029
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother 0-5 -0.036*** -0.049***
(0.01) (0.01)
Mother 6-12 -0.045*** -0.062***
(0.01) (0.01)
Mother 13-17 0.008 0.010
(0.02) (0.02)
Mother 18+ 0.029* 0.023
(0.02) (0.02)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Primary 0.160** 0.257***
(0.07) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Primary 0.162*** 0.120*
(0.06) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Primary 0.031 0.053
(0.09) (0.08)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Primary -0.059 -0.114
(0.10) (0.11)
Lesbian Mother 0-5 - Secondary 0.065 0.059
(0.06) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 6-12 - Secondary 0.012 0.068
(0.05) (0.06)
Lesbian Mother 13-17 - Secondary -0.047 -0.033
(0.07) (0.07)
Lesbian Mother  18+ - Secondary -0.068 0.035
(0.09) (0.08)
Usual Hours Worked 0.000
(0.00)
Constant 2.355*** 2.344*** 2.370*** 2.372***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 279398 279398 178870 178870
R-squared 0.370 0.371 0.392 0.394
Notes: Author's calculation on 2010 ACS data. Standard errors in parentheses. Results for 
occupation, race, ethnicity, region, metropolitan status, education, and potential experience not 
shown. Statistically significant results denominated by *** (p<0.01), ** (p<0.05), * (p<0.1).
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Figure A1: DFL analysis with IPUMS definition of mother: lesbian versus straight 
married women 
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Figure A2: DFL analysis with IPUMS definition of mother: lesbian versus straight 
unmarried women 
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Table B1: Predicting Minutes Spent in Different Work for Different-Sex Couples 
 
Different-Sex 
Married 
Different-Sex 
Unmarried 
Different-
Sex Married 
Diff rent-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Different-
Sex Married 
Different-Sex 
Unmarried 
Different-
Sex 
Married 
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Female -68.266*** -66.422*** 38.490*** 23.826*** 37.654*** 43.134*** 82.416*** 89.198***
(3.905) -15.138 (1.085) (3.711) (2.399) (12.376) (4.542) (21.914)State with 
marriage 
Rights -6.708 -34.964* 1.528 -0.574 1.765 42.638** -9.495* 79.694***
(4.776) -19.898 (1.233) (3.771) (2.851) (16.602) (5.366) (29.943)Marriage 
Rights * Lower 
Earner -3.350 45.113 0.364 -3.601 2.876 8.164 -4.938 -82.842*
(7.738) -32.481 (2.136) (7.159) (4.800) (36.126) (8.891) (45.377)Children in 
Household -19.690*** -40.564*** 3.034*** 3.856 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(3.810) -15.393 (0.988) (2.954) (.) (.) (.) (.)Children * 
Lower Earner -4.520** -0.518 3.629*** 2.168 -30.879*** -10.949 -34.484*** 12.681
(2.302) -10.028 (0.745) (2.358) (3.727) (19.113) (7.470) (50.373)Percent Men 
in Job 29.499*** 31.76 -3.941** -8.217 0.008*** -0.034*** -0.019*** -0.070***
(6.463) -27.307 (1.561) (6.172) (0.001) (0.011) (0.003) (0.024)Absolute 
Weekly 
Earnings 0.038*** 0.044*** -0.004*** -0.002 10.287*** 0.333 5.537 -9.773
(0.003) -0.015 (0.001) (0.004) (2.453) (10.490) (4.516) (29.494)Lower Earner 
in Couple 1.071 5.652 -2.390* 4.949 -1.402*** -1.571*** 0.039 -0.303
(4.681) -18.246 (1.324) (4.973) (0.144) (0.583) (0.267) (1.196)
Absolute Age -1.299*** 0.19 0.163*** 0.655*** 2.113 7.266 -1.481 11.677
(0.166) -0.602 (0.042) (0.134) (2.054) (9.705) (3.876) (19.351)Older Person 
in Couple 5.811* -15.535 -0.616 -0.390 -1.641 23.677 -14.235 -10.697
(3.344) -13.529 (0.856) (2.852) (6.504) (29.118) (12.905) (40.319)Person of 
Color - 
Interracial 15.847 -49.245 -2.181 3.540 1.887 -35.651 -0.034 50.331
(12.224) -34.206 (2.386) (8.734) (10.492) (37.641) (21.091) (66.172)Person of 
Color * Lower 
Earner -17.148 -3.224 -9.221** -25.645** -6.288 -28.080* 20.541 6.099
(21.012) -56.348 (3.751) (11.843) (5.932) (16.119) (13.604) (39.135)Hispanic - 
Interethnic -8.068 -52.733 4.918 13.493** 4.516 26.292 -6.202 -92.131
(11.581) -37.469 (3.069) (6.267) (10.931) (28.544) (22.492) (59.028)
Hispanic 
Interracial * 
Lower Earner 9.266 53.933 -6.307 -6.513 7.837*** 33.122** 2.990 8.963
(19.634) -51.32 (5.459) (17.763) (2.328) (14.837) (4.141) (18.864)
Lower 
Education -9.166** -18.104 3.013*** 4.303 -15.662*** 71.551 250.962*** 190.762***
(3.567) -16.06 (0.986) (4.243) (5.966) (45.922) (16.213) (64.363)
Interview on 
Holiday -255.317*** -237.805*** 5.071 -9.824 -6.535*** -4.433 252.359*** 179.369***
(10.790) -42.733 (3.223) (8.444) (1.630) (9.863) (3.509) (20.047)
Interview on 
Weekend -331.489*** -287.812*** 22.555*** 18.705*** 133.943*** 123.706*** 230.763*** 228.115***
(2.609) -11.988 (0.805) (3.111) (6.446) (24.652) (11.948) (65.780)
Constant 503.707*** 450.437*** 2.331 -9.908 160.637*** 130.237*** 160.637*** 130.237***
(10.744) -32.756 (2.613) (6.610) (4.953) (20.688) (4.953) (20.688)
Observations 43482 2383 43482 2383 23186 814 23186 814
Supervisory Care work
Notes: Author's calculation on ATUS data 2003-2011 data. Standard errors in parenthases. *, **, *** denotes p<.01, .05, 
.10 respectively. 
Paid work Household work Care work
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Table B2: Access to same-sex marriage or a marriage-like institution for same-sex 
couples, by state 
 
 
State Form of Legal Arrangement Available Date Used in Analysis
California 
Domestic partnershipsince 10/14/2001; 
between 6/14/2008 and 11/4/2008 marriage 
was possible, domestic parntership again in 
place after that 10/14/2001
Colorado 
Designated Beneficiary Agreement providing 
certain rights and responsibilities, including 
hospital visitation, medical decision making, 
and inheritance since 7/1 /2009 7/1/2009
Connecticut 
Civil union since 7/1 /2009 and full marriage 
since 10/10/2008 10/1/2005
Delaware 
Civil union since 1/1/2012 (not represented in 
2003-2011 ATUS data) 1/1/2012
District of 
Columbia
Domestic partnership since 2002, extended on 
4/4/2006 to almost completely equal rights; 
marriage since 3/3/2010 4/4/2006
Hawaii 
Reciprocal beneficiary relationship giving 
basic rights since 1997; since 1/1/2012 civil 
unions 7/8/1997
Illinois Civil union 6/1/2011
Iowa Marriage 4/27/2009
Maine Domestic partner registry 7/30/2004
Maryland 
Domestic partners are entitled to certain 
rights  since 7/1/2008; marriage since 1/1/2013 7/1/2008
Massachusetts Marriage 5/17/2004
Nevada Domestic partnership with equal rights 10/1/2009
New Hampshire Civil union; marriage since 1/1/2010 1/1/2008
New Jersey Civil union 2/19/2007
New York Marriage 7/24/2011
Oregon Domestic partnership 2/4/2008
Rhode Island 
Civil union; domestic partnership with very 
few rights since 2002 7/1/2011
Vermont Civil union; full mariage since 9/1/2009 7/1/2000
Washington 
Domestic partnership; full marriage  since 
12/6/2012 7/22/2007
Wisconsin Domestic partnership 8/3/2009
Notes: Author's compilation based on data from the Human Rights Campaign, April 2013. 
The 31 states not shown are coded as having no marriage or marriage-like institution 
available to same-sex couples. 
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Table B3: Minutes Spend Caring for Household Children versus Household Adults 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Different-
Sex Married 
Men
Different-
Sex Married 
Women
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Men
Different-
Sex 
Unmarried 
Women
Same-Sex 
Men
Same-Sex 
Women
Time Spend in Household 
Children Care 
(Households with at least 
one child) 134.9 241.3 136.4 227.6 155.6 214.9
(1.686) (1.956) (9.807) (9.090) (50.100) (36.411)
Time Spent in Household 
Adult Care (Households 
with at least one other 
adult) 1.5 2.6 1.1 2.1 5.0 1.4
(0.151) (0.202) (0.293) (0.803) (4.999) (1.362)
Notes: Author's calculation on 2003-2011 ATUS data. 
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